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 ABSTRACT 
This work is an exploration of shifting American attitudes toward key cultural 
myths during and after the Vietnam War from 1965-1975. Using sources such as memoir, 
film, and relevant historiography of the time this thesis emphasizes an exploration of the 
shifting attitudes of Americans during the Cold War. An epoch defined by a “utopian” 
vision of American history that was codified in a Post War period. This included a 
tradition of enlightenment values, liberal consensus, a technocratic order, and a deep 
abiding myth in progress. While this period has been extensively studied, I suggest there 
has not been enough attention given to the existential dialogue, using American 
conceived interpretations of nature, to explore this transformative period in American 
history.  
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INTRODUCTION  
 American soldiers officially first set foot in South Vietnam in March 1965 when 
marines arrived in the strategic city port of Da Nang. The next eight years saw harsh 
guerrilla warfare that defied all expectations of military and civilian experts. The 
American public was shocked to its core by the tone of the war, the lying by its 
government, the anti-war protests, and other disruptions that seemed to mirror the events 
in Vietnam. As one man wrote in a letter to his veteran friend after the war. 
Your time in Nam resonates with me, quite deeply. Like many of our generation, 
Vietnam was at the center. From 1965-1975, Vietnam seemed (to me) the black 
hole around which the decade floated. The music, the protests, the drugs, the 
clothing, the long hair, the changes in academic curricula, the attitudes towards 
the “establishment,” Chicago in 1968, Watergate, Nixon, Nixon’ resignation, LBJ 
not running for re-election McGovern, free speech, Woodstock, Altamont, rights 
for blacks & women, environmental concerns, open sexual mores… it all seemed 
to float around the darkness that was Vietnam. Like many others, I spent a 
number of years making sure I did not go to Nam.1 
American expectations before Vietnam came from their throne as a dominant global 
power. American power was triple-fold: its military was legion, its economy hummed 
with growth, goods, and services, and its culture was confident emitting purpose and 
strong belief in itself. To American leaders Vietnam would be just another front against 
communism. The war served as an exercise in America’s power to construct democratic 
nations. As Vice Lyndon Johnson explained in a memo sent to President John Kennedy, 
“In large measure, the greatest danger Southeast Asia offers to nations like the United 
                                                 
1 James Wright, Enduring Vietnam: An American Generation and Its War (New York: Saint Martin Press, 
2017), 3.  
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States is not the momentary threat of communism itself, rather that danger stems from 
hunger, ignorance, poverty & disease. We must – whatever strategies we evolve – keep 
these enemies at the point of our attack and make imaginative use of our scientific & 
technological capability in such enterprise.”2 However, instead, Vietnam became one of 
the most controversial events in American memory. 
The war would be waged with all American modern armaments of war from 
rockets, bombs, napalm, B-52s, phantom jets, Army, Marine, and Navy forces in the 
small nation hugging the Southeastern Indochina coast cost 58,000 American lives, and 
upwards of several million Vietnam soldier and civilian deaths. War came to Vietnam for 
a variety of reasons including the fading desires of old empires, the sweeping calls for 
sovereignty from colonization by the Vietnamese people from the French, to the powerful 
rallying cry of socialist rhetoric, and the influential presence of the two Cold War super 
powers those being the United States and the Soviet Union. The story began when the 
French had reinvaded Vietnam to restore some of their former empire. However, after 
their defeat at the battle of Dien-Bien Phu it was clear the Vietnamese resistance led by 
their leader Ho-Chi Minh would secure the country.  
Unwilling to see a nation sprout in Asia supported by the communist powers of 
China and the Soviet Union the U.S. stepped in to the fray slowly becoming more and 
more embroiled in the country’s affairs between 1955-1964. From President Eisenhower, 
to President Kennedy millions of dollars and military advisors flooded into South 
Vietnam long before the war officially started in 1965. South Vietnam came into being 
                                                 
2 The Pentagon Papers: As Published by the New York Times (New York: Bantam Books, 1971). 
3 
 
after the end of the French Indo China war and the signing an end to the hostilities in 
1955 at Geneva. With the Vietnamese nation split north and south along the 17th parallel 
conflict was inevitable. The North sent supplies and men south to topple the weak despot 
regime of South Vietnamese President Diem. America stepped in officially in 1965 to 
prop up the collapsing South Vietnam government.  
The political and cultural consequences caused by this decision would occur 
slowly, but eventually they would form into a giant wave, surging through the arteries of 
American consciousness that disrupted their Post War myths, identity, and confidence. 
Not only had America’s political climate and landscape changed fundamentally, but a 
larger cultural shift occurred affecting American attitudes toward authority, tastes in film, 
dress, music and darker perceptions of their nation’s future. As Timothy J Lomperis 
noted, “the real Gordian Knot to the understanding of the Vietnam War is not over 
unfathomable facts but a deep-seated clash over values.”3 When the last American soldier 
left Vietnam in 1973 many considered this the symbol of the end of a great epoch. There 
was a new popular awareness that a historical transition had just occurred. What that 
transition, the ending of the previous epoch, or what the new epoch meant would be 
debated endlessly in America for the next several decades.  
  
                                                 
3 Mark Taylor, The Vietnam War in History, Literature, & Film (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 
2003), 23.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
IN THE GARDEN OF EDEN  
U.S. Marine Lieutenant Philip Caputo squatted into the earth, cold mud gripping 
his army issued boots, and plotted murder. His hollow, bruise-rimmed eyes, soaked in the 
valley aesthetics with its cosmic cornucopia of greenery, winding rivers, and far-off misty 
mountain tops. For Caputo the landscape was no longer beautiful. He had once 
appreciated it, long ago when he landed on the beaches of Vietnam in 1965. Caputo had 
been so filled with hope and eager boyhood energy to play the game of war back then. A 
lifetime ago, it seemed. Months of being trapped here taught him the reality of this place. 
He was now intimately familiar with the dangers lurking beneath the sea of green foliage 
before him. It had transformed from a siren call of adventure and nation building into a 
maddening, and utterly alien wilderness: an experience that had led him to doubt his 
country and even his identity as a U.S. Marine. The landscape wasn't the only thing that 
had changed as Caputo’s state of mind had become transformed by this “wilderness.” He 
had grown to hate it as he described here. 
A few yards outside the perimeter, the walls of a half-ruined building shone bright 
white in the sun’s glare… I looked at them for a long time. I don’t know why I 
just remember staring at them. The building had been a temple of some kind, but 
it was now little more than a pile of stones. Vines growing over the stones and 
over the jagged, bullet scarred walls, which turned from white to hot-pink as the 
sun dropped into the clouds. Behind the building lay the scrub jungle that covered 
the slopes of the hill. It smelled of decaying wood and leaves, and the low trees 
encircled the outpost like the disorderly ranks of a besieging army. Staring at the 
jungle and at the ruined temple, hatred welled up in me: a hatred for this green, 
moldy alien world in which we fought and died. 4 
                                                 
4 Philip Caputo, A Rumor of War (New York: Holt, Rinehart, & Winston, 1977), 315.  
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His thoughts festered as the sun passed high into the sky and the heat of the day 
grew. An impatient need to retaliate against the mines, jungle, and the Vietnamese people 
welled up inside the Lieutenant. It would be easy. He knew the location of his two 
targets. They occupied a small hut below in the valley, and his warriors could arrive 
unexpectedly at night. But who to send? The camp behind him - a mockery of the official 
name “forward fire base” given by the camps leaders - was marked by crater shells, 
rotting sandbags, trash, a stubborn fecal aroma, and discarded sheets of metal and 
ammunition. It was a disgusting place, and full of men who would follow his orders to 
kill the two old Vietnamese farmers without hesitation. Men too tired from the exhausting 
heat, too tired of this war, and too tired of being rained on incessantly to protest. By the 
next morning Caputo had gotten his retaliation. Two old men - most likely innocent 
farmers - lay dead in their huts.  
 Many consider Philip Caputo emblematic of the fallen American spirit in 
Vietnam. He was a young man who had been filled with a noble desire to fight a war 
against communist expansion. Instead in the Vietnam War he became transformed into a 
man who saw two old men as dangerous military targets and ordered their assassination. 
Within this hazy moment of history, we see themes of the American perspective of the 
Vietnam War. A story that essentially tells a narrative of the American soldier falling into 
the alien world of Indochina that traps him within a din of violence. From setting off trip 
wires or stumbling blindly into mines, sniper fire, and Viet-Cong ambushes Caputo and 
millions of other soldiers like him cannot escape the “green moldy alien world” they are 
trapped within. Philip Caputo’s story is highlighted by the historical context with the 
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ending of an epoch. It was the ending of nearly two decades of an American postwar 
technocratic liberal order with a populace that believed firmly in their nation’s myth of 
historical progress. In Caputo’s story we read the themes common to many stories 
dealing with the emergence of the perceptions that came after this epochs end: themes of 
disruption, disillusionment, death, dystopian projection, alienation, and confusion.  
  I suggest that American attitudes and ideas about nature are key to understanding 
themes around this shift in American history between 1965-1975. Nature and human 
perceptions of it, I suggest, linked themselves within the use of a metaphor that 
disparaged the American myth of progress A piece of this myth of progress was the 
process of driving back the forces of chaos identified within categories of nature such as 
wilderness. This ideology of the myth within America society identified American 
actions and their history as part of a grand story of human progress: a major aspect of this 
progress was their conquest of nature. The fruits of progress included increased life 
spans, food stability, convenience, transportation, communication, and improved 
numerous social nodes of the technocratic liberal power structure of the 20th century by 
then industrial society of America had produced an abundance and prosperity unseen in 
human history.  
The idea of progress was an important ideal in Post War America. President 
Kennedy’s ideal of a romantic frontier past became linked with his New Frontier. 
Secretary of State Robert McNamara and other liberal idealists saw Vietnam as a blank 
canvas to continue the American myth of progress. These men would do so by using their 
theories of industry, warfare, and nation-building to re-forge another “frontier” region 
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from its wilderness of poverty and chaos into a democratic bulwark against the corrosive 
powers of communism. It is in this view that Vietnam was a new metaphor for the 
wilderness of Americas long lost frontier. The war in Vietnam was supposed to have 
been a continuation of their story of bringing enlightenment, democracy, economic 
prosperity, and liberty to a dark corner of the world ruled by chaos and tyranny. 
 However, Vietnam would actively disrupt this story and instead create a new 
metaphor of dystopian disillusionment. In a manner of speaking the wars memory and 
iconography constructed a twisted mythos of the war vocalized through the Vietnam 
metaphor. In this metaphor Vietnam became a land that imbued disillusionment within 
popular memory that actively attacked the ideology of progress. This was a story where 
America did not conquer a “wilderness” like their ancestors had done, but instead, 
became defeated by it. Both the landscape of Vietnam, its people, the jungles and rice 
paddies, and American actions within it became a vivid metaphor of the failure of 
American belief in technology, the American frontiersmen, and by extension the grand 
utopian American optimism: ideas that buoyed the American myth of progress. By 
observing Vietnam in this view, I suggest, part of its metaphor took on the traditional role 
of “wilderness” in the struggle of American power vs nature. In American myths chaos is 
usually represented by nature, and its story followed a people using enlightenment and 
scientific ideals to slowly remove themselves from chaos, and bring about a world of 
order and purpose.5 Nature in this historical perception is an antagonistic force 
                                                 
5 James Scott, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition have Failed 
(London: Yale University Press, 1998), 18.  
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representing reality that imposes chaos on otherwise “logical,” “spiritual,” and 
“meaningful,” human systems.   
Going back to Philip Caputo’s fall from grace on the hilltop overlooking the ruins 
overrun with vines and in his camp surrounded by an “army of trees,” and observing the 
“valley of death” below him, we see the building blocks for the ecological Vietnam 
metaphor.  As we see Caputo using his conceptions of nature as both antagonists, setting, 
and metaphor.  
The air-conditioned HQ in Saigon and Danang seemed thousands of miles away. 
As for the USA we did not call it the “world” for nothing: it might as well have 
been on another planet. There was nothing familiar out where we were, no 
churches, no police, no laws… or any of the restraining influences without which 
the earth’s population of virtuous people would be reduced by 95%. It was the 
dawn of creation in the Indochina bush an ethical as well as geographical 
wilderness. Out there, lacking restraint, sanctioned to kill, confronted by a hostile 
country and a relentless enemy, we sank into a brutish state.6 
In this quote we see Caputo framing his understand of a progressive society that 
generated feelings of optimism but also anxiety and insecurity: before eventually clashing 
with the “ethical and geographic wilderness.”  
Within the abundance of America’s suburbs, Caputo along with many young men 
felt they could not participate in their nations’ journey toward progress: but only bathe in 
its afterglow. American had created a wonderous myth for the nation in the post war 
years. Myths help construct identity and connect individual actions within a larger 
narrative of meaning.7 Nature, like previous understandings and narratives within 
                                                 
6 Philip Caputo, A Rumor of War (New York: Holt, Rinehart, & Winston, 1977), xciii.  
7 Joseph Campbell, Bill D. Moyers, and Betty Flowers, The Power of Myth (New York: Anchor Books, 
1991). 
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America’s myth was a way to conceptualize a path out of the stifling over-civilization he 
found himself within. Caputo yearned for not just any nature, he yearned for a place of 
adventure and meaning. In the myth of America this place was defined by the frontier or 
as Americans perceived it a vast wilderness full of peril, but also, of great potential. He 
sought a return to wilderness which would allow him a chance for his glory. Thus, for 
Caputo his journey into Vietnam was as much about meeting a brutal ecology as it was 
coming to terms with his country’s myth of progress, finding the two were very much 
linked.  
The American soldier in Vietnam became a key actor within the Vietnam 
metaphor: serving as an unwilling vanguard against ideals of American progress. Like the 
pioneers of old whose rough existence against the ecological reality of the frontier 
falsified the romantic visions of urban poets and intellectuals, Caputo, along with 
thousands of other veterans took on a similar role in their works of fiction and memoir. 
Within the wilderness of “jungle,” “bush,” or “quagmire” soldiers interactions 
highlighted themes of anti-heroism, moral decay, relativism, barbarism, apocalypse, and 
spiritual loss. Their war story unlike that of World War II translated a metaphor which 
contradicted the myth of American heroism, adventure, progress and ultimate victory. 
Instead, they infused themes of pain and suffering in their narration that translated 
profound alienation within American society during this time. 
An important part of the early metaphor tied to ecology was the title in journalist 
David Halberstam’s book The Making of a Quagmire. The title of his work imprinted a 
vivid image that became so popular it would sum up the orthodox interpretation of the 
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Vietnam war for years. This history, broadly speaking, argued that Americans’ good 
intentions became marred inside an Asian “wilderness” of guerrilla warfare that forced 
America leaders like Presidents Kennedy and Johnson to commit deeper into a situation 
that they could not remove themselves from: much like a naive man walking further away 
from the city until he finds himself sinking into a hellish bog. Orthodox histories such as 
Neil Sheehan’s A Bright Shining Lie, David Halberstam’s The Making of a Quagmire, 
and the more historical chronicles of the war like Stanley Karnow’s Vietnam: A History 
explain the war largely within this narrative.8 The Washington Post’s political cartoonist 
Herblock gave this idea a visible portrayal in the striking image of an ever worrying 
President Lyndon Johnson sinking further into the Asian bog.  
Journalist David Halberstam’s heavy use of ecology to interpret the Vietnam 
experience represented the first wave that broke from the official accounts of what was 
happening in Vietnam, but it would not be the last. In 1968 after the Tet Offensive, 
Bobby Kennedy used another ecological phrase to explain the failure of American 
military strategy. “We have misconceived the nature of the war… we have sought to 
resolve by military might a conflict whose issues depends upon the well and conviction 
of the South Vietnamese people. It is like sending a lion to halt an epidemic of Jungle 
Rot.”9 
                                                 
8 Neil Sheehan, A Bright Shining Lie: John Paul Vann and America in Vietnam (New York: Random 
House, 1988); Stanley Karnow, Vietnam: A History (New York: Penguin Books, 1984); David Halberstam, 
The Making of a Quagmire: America and Vietnam During the Kennedy Era (New York: Rowman & 
Littlefield, 1965). 
9 A Broadside by Bobby. Newsweek, February 19, 1968, 24.  
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Fig 1: Herbert Block, Uncle Sam carrying a machine gun over his head while caught in a 
swamp labeled ASIA, Political Cartoon, Washington Post, c. 1968. Library of Congress.  
 
Iconography of landscapes played a big part in crafting the American memory of the 
Vietnam war. Expressions, descriptions, and visuals of “quagmire,” “bogs,” “jungle rot,” 
“hellish jungle,” and “the bush” illustrated the scene of the war as a stinking morass of 
dense foliage. Another important aspect of this iconography that helped build the 
Vietnam memoir was the use of American technology.  
Chemical warfare and the primitive scenes of sickly, frightened villagers were 
hard to ignore. Images of C-123s dropping gallons of orange mist also quickly cemented 
12 
 
itself in the war’s iconography. Works by the scientists such as Arthur H. Westing, E.W 
Pfeiffer, John Dux and Peter Young, and by historians like Edwin A. Martini have given 
great focus to the devastation of the people and the natural world in Indo-China.10 The 
power to devastate the natural world on an industrial scale, and for that devastation to be 
understood as irreversible fit neatly within new global anxieties about environmental 
decline, that highlighted a new concern within a global understanding of 
environmentalism. It also represented a theme of the American “weakness” witnessed 
within their over-reliance on technology instead of strategy and diplomacy. These 
historians in their own way used the environment to narrate a symbolic “fall” witnessed 
in the wanton destruction of the biological space of Southeast-Indochina by an arrogant 
superpower.  
The United States’ mistaken faith in technology was further examined by 
Historian James Gibson’s The Perfect War that highlighted a culture within the American 
military and government that simplified the war for the sake of convenience. According 
to Gibson this culture of technophiles went on to create not only high civilian, and 
military casualties, but also helped conduct a losing strategy as American technology 
could not always navigate the difficult Indo-China terrain.11 Other environmental 
historians highlighted this disgust in a new global context over the American’s use of 
chemical weapons, wide scale aerial bombing campaigns, and vegetation clearance with 
                                                 
10 See. Edwin Martini, Agent Orange: History, Science and the Politics of Uncertainty (Boston: University 
of Massachusetts Press, 2012); Arthur H. Westing and E W. Pfeiffer, “The Cratering of Indochina,” 
Scientific American 226, no.5 (1972): 20-29, Doi:10.1038/scientificamerican0572-20; John Dux and Peter 
J. Young, Agent Orange – the Bitter Harvest (Sydney: Hodder and Stoughton, 1980). 
11 James Gibson, The Perfect War: Technowar in Vietnam (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1986). 
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Rome plows and tanks. Historian D. Zierler highlighted an investigation into America’s 
chemical warfare during President Nixon’s administration that, ironically, helped develop 
legal language recognizing the rights of environmental spaces to not be destroyed. This 
resulted in the official recognition of words like ecocide to describe intentional harm on 
ecological spaces by governments or individuals.12 However, within Vietnam’s 
historiography, fights over the cultural aspects of the war have overshadowed the 
environmental context, and I would suggest that this is despite nature being clearly 
represented symbolically both within these cultural battlefields in vast Vietnam’s 
literature, and iconography.  
The cultural historiography of the Vietnam War is too large to list here, as 
Historian David Anderson wrote in the preamble to the Columbia History of the Vietnam 
War, “The study of the war, as the thousands of titles on the subject demonstrate, does 
not now and may never approach a level of intellectual agreement that can be labeled 
definitive.”13 Works like Richard Slotkin’s Gunfighter Nation, Bruce Franklin’s, M.I.A, 
or Mythmaking in America, and Tom Engelhardt’s The End of Victory Culture 
highlighted massive shifts in American perceptions toward their history, violence, and 
values. Historical interpretations highlighted cultural battles, and the nodes that served as 
sparks for political movements, new conservative ideologies, and a new cultural 
                                                 
12 D Zierler, “Against Protocol: Ecocide, Détente, and the Question of Chemical Warfare in Vietnam, 
1969–1975,” in Environmental Histories of the Cold War, eds. J. McNeill & C. Unger, Publications of the 
German Historical Institute (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 227-256. 
13 David Anderson, The Columbia History of the Vietnam War (New York: Columbia University Press, 
2010), x. 
14 
 
perceptions of American history.14 The influence and subtle motivations of racial and 
gender based perceptions were each separately highlighted by Richard Drinnon’s Facing 
West: the Metaphysics of Indian-hating and Empire Building, and Susan Jeffords The 
Remasculinization of America.15 Other historians such as Andrew Martin in Receptions of 
War continued to explore the role of technology and film in shaping post war attitudes. 
The role of technology and iconography in giving weight to false narratives was further 
explored by Jerry Lembke in The Spitting Image, as the imagery of the beaten veteran so 
widely used by politicians was reexamined and found to have never occurred.16 Given 
this massive array of interpretations, the role of nature in influencing the orthodox, 
revisionist, political, or cultural narratives that emerged after Vietnam is something to 
note. Nature as a symbol and metaphor, I suggest, clearly represented something larger 
than indicated by the number of authors who have written about it as environmental 
Historian David Biggs alluded to here. 
The arrival of American troops in Vietnam in 1965 inaugurated one of the 
bloodiest engagements of the Cold War: it also triggered a surge of writing on the 
conflict that has yet to abate.... Yet despite all the artistic and scholarly work, few 
have yet to consider the role of environments-historic, built, or natural – in 
shaping the events of the conflict. Nor do very many post-war scholars consider 
lasting effects of the conflict on Vietnamese places.17 
                                                 
14 Richard Slotkin, Gunfighter Nation (New York: Athenaeum, 1992); Bruce Franklin, M.I.A, or 
Mythmaking in America (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1993); Tom Engelhardt, The End 
of Victory Culture: Cold War America and the Disillusioning of a Generation (Massachusetts: University 
of Massachusetts Press, 1995).  
15 Susan Jeffords, The Remasculinization of America (Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1980); Richard 
Drinnon, Facing West: The Metaphysics of Indian-Hating and Empire-Building (New York: Meridian 
Books, 1980).  
16 Jerry Lembcke, The Spitting Image: Myth Memory and the Legacy of Vietnam (New York: University of 
Press, 1998).  
17 David Biggs, Quagmire: Nation Building and Nature in the Mekong Delta (Seattle: University of 
Washington Press, 2012), 197.  
15 
 
Biggs was correct to point out that nearly every ounce of creative, ideological, 
and historical method of inquiry has been used to wring all sorts of narratives from the 
Vietnam War. Yet, very little energy has been used to emphasize how nature is deeply 
connected within these narratives. As human geographer Linda Nash said in her book 
Inescapable Ecologies, “the most radical notion to emerge in the 20th century was that 
people were inescapably tied to a larger ecosystem.”18 A notion that also emerged with 
Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring, and the Vietnam War, and other breaches that alerted 
people to the reality that separation from these ecosystems was an illusion: nature did not 
follow the logic of progress. The Vietnam War’s role in this discovery was largely 
symbolic, becoming codified in minds and hearts through the defeat of American 
technology and its soldiers by the Vietnamese. A people who became represented as 
incarnations of “nature” in their “primitive” exitance and military strategy. In the 
personal accounts of soldiers many became radicalized against various paradigms that 
favored technology and progress.19 These men became radicalized not through 
ideological indoctrination, but by discovering themselves as fragile, biological organisms 
in a hostile ecosystem. A pain they later reconstructed within the Vietnam metaphor that 
launched subversive attacks on various narratives of progress and American ideals of 
liberalism. 
                                                 
18 Linda Nash, Inescapable Ecologies: A History of Environment, Disease & Knowledge (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2003).  
19 See William Pfaff, “The Decline of Liberal Politics,” Commentary, Oct 1, 1969; Lucas Carpenter, “It 
Didn’t Mean Nothing: Vietnam War fiction & Post Modernism,” College Literature, 30, no. 2 (Spring 
2003): 30-50, 32; Robert Tome, Apocalypse Then: American Intellectuals and the Vietnam War, 1954-1975 
(New York: University Press, 1998). 
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Historian John Hellman’s American Myth and the Legacy of Vietnam is one of the 
few to make a direct connection between perception of nature and the growing unrest 
back in America. As Hellman states here, “But in the version of this landscape that the 
New Left was able to create from Johnson’s war, Americans who wanted to align 
themselves with nature against the machine would have no alternative but to reject the 
American society itself.”20 The metaphors of the collapse of civilization, of the American 
psyche, the sense of despair and hopelessness rooted in nihilistic observations of nature 
itself are key components of the themes surrounding the Vietnam war. Iconography like 
the burning B-52s in Khe Sahn, the spraying of orange chemicals over jungles, the 
harrowed hallow eyed stares of GI’s going out on patrol, the burning of thatched villages 
with zippo lighters, the strange wilderness of Vietnam and the “primitive” existence of its 
people with bamboo huts, elephant grass, rice paddies, ancient canals - all alien, and 
foreign, and ultimately “victorious” against the American Techno Empire of sensors, 
bullets, bombs, machines, and empire filled with imagined John Wayne heroes became 
imagery ingrained in the American psyche.  
The presence of nature in Vietnam was built American expectations and 
narratives about their own forms of their narration within areas of “wilderness,” places 
such as the Wild West and the expanding frontiers of the 18th and 19th century. These 
narratives were born in part from the vast North American interior where American 
writers and intellectuals often searched within nature for key metaphors to understand 
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American culture and its values. As sociologist Burch Williams wrote in his observations 
of tribes, “the tribesman looks into nature & sees himself, but Western man consistently 
looks into nature to find himself.”21 American poets, writers, and filmmakers conceptions 
of the frontier, and wild west, were imbued with hopes of individualism, and anti-
civilizational cultural primitivism: to larger state and civic orders such as Jeffersonian 
equality, yeoman farmers and transcendental naturalism.22 Many of these ideas derived 
from their similar European conceptions and myths of society and nature. This included 
concepts such as dominion over nature and the separation of mankind and nature as in the 
story of Adam and Eve. Held within these views were beliefs of geography that was good 
or evil: geographies within landscapes of social and techno-orders. For example, the 
Germans name for this sacred landscape was called Landschaft, a medieval conception of 
land and space as a symbol.23 Sacred geography was evident in the early medieval 
aesthetic order of villages and the church. These were sacred geographies to these people 
that denoted a social order, history, memory, identity, and meaning. This was the bulwark 
to the natural and “supernatural” forces of chaos in human perceptions of far off 
wilderness.  
These narratives of progress within nature were fundamental to the American 
mythos. American history is rife with physically remaking wilds into gardens, plots of 
land, acres to be toiled farmed and overseen. It was a process of removing chaos and 
introducing control and order that was key to the myths function as a pragmatic and 
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philosophical tool. Modern America viewed the past as a landscape of ceaseless 
transition from one disaster to the next, catastrophes such as food shortages, famine, 
plague, and war that plagued human endeavors for order and stability. Before this golden 
age of abundance anxiety abounded around the cycles of these disasters. The 19th century 
painter Thomas Cole created a series of paintings titled The Course of Empire that 
reflected this perception. Through the five stages of The Savage State, The Arcadian or 
Pastoral State, The Consummation of Empire, Destruction, and finally Desolation we a 
narrative that mirrors a meta-historical reality of the recurring cycles of growth, peak, and 
decline. The Cycle of Desolation related the final victory of ecology as legions of varying 
fauna return and grew eagerly over the decaying ruins of a once great human city. The 
cobbled market, the great stone works, and their once industrious and clever inhabitants 
were gone and trampled, buried beneath the inexorable growth of these invasive plants 
and vines: now free to reconquer the land for their own obtuse and empty end. The 
narrative emphasized the transformation of “wilderness” into something of human use, 
and through this transformation a great empire is birthed and rises, before it eventually 
collapsed, and nature returns to oversee the ruins.  
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Fig 2:  Thomas Cole, Painting, oil on canvas, Course of Empire, The Savage State, The 
Arcadian State, The Consumption of Empire, Destruction, c. 1836. Library of Congress.  
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Americans ideas about empire had built themselves on ideas of a conquest over 
nature such as the conception of Manifest destiny, the frontier, and popular imagery of 
the Wild West. This included a form of storytelling and narrative that used ideas of nature 
to help identify themes of American character or important pieces of their social order 
such as freedom, autonomy, liberty, change, and democratic inclusion. This process was 
articulated by Historian Frederick Jackson Turner in the late 19th century during the 
“closure” of the frontier. Turner suggested that part of the American character and energy 
came from the constant shifting cycle of bringing order to the American West. 
Throughout this grand process that saw exploration, conflict, taming, and eventually 
settlement the unique charm and power of the American character was born. Thus, for 
Turner and many others the physical closure of this process evoked a turning point in 
American history.24 Turner and others expressed uncertainty about the physical closure of 
expansion and what it held for their country’s future. Without a “west” would the 
American enterprise become another fading power like that of Europe? These fears of 
growing weakness, lack of purpose, and fretting over identity were reawakened again 
during the deep anxieties of the height of America’s technocratic liberal order in the 
middle of the 1950s.  
This cultural yearning for meaning occurred during a period that historian Eric 
Hobsbawm called the “Golden Age,” a time of relative safety, social and political 
cohesion, rapid economic growth and stability.25 It was an era defined by its economic 
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booms, expansive government, a rising middle class, and massive reductions in poverty, 
homelessness, and increases in high wages and job security.26 In America, a large liberal 
coalition guided this growth: their reign largely unchallenged as they maneuvered policy 
and bills that subsidized housing, education, and other programs.27 This was the 
domination of a new modern industrial mind which valued the virtues of progress 
through Keynesian economic models, which in the dreamy enclosure of such wonderous 
growth, seemed to have allowed America to break from the previous cycles of the history 
depicted in Thomas Cole’s paintings of desolation and destruction. The government 
provided capital for infrastructure and large social safety nets like the New Deal and Fair 
Deal programs and eventually President Lyndon Johnson’s Great Society programs of 
health care and welfare. It was a small age that represented a broad homogenous 
consensus culture of intellectuals, society, and politics, but also symbolically resonated 
with many mythological conceptions of American history.28 
This Golden Age led many intellectuals to find utopianism in America’s 
enterprise. Utopias are defined by their “placeless-ness,” existing in their conceptions 
within satire and critique in a sort of far-off fantasy world. This was the case because 
utopian worlds exist outside the state of history. They were removed from the tragic story 
of disaster, horror, war, the rise of civilization and then eventual collapse in human 
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society.29 In America, utopianism as a reality fit neatly within the apex of technocratic 
liberalism in the 1960s, as its architects saw American society as a framework for the 
whole globe through economic and social development. This goal of this American 
liberalism was perceived to ensure American preeminence, and also, to combat 
communist subversion.30 Conceptualized primarily by intellectuals and industrialists, this 
utopian idea found its champion in President Kennedy, who seemed to embody the next 
development in the American spirit as he led his people to overcome the lethargy and 
anxiety of the Eisenhower administration and forge it into a powerful message of 
nationalistic idealism: born of the deeper American myths of  historical progress. As the 
relatively young president intoned in his acceptance speech in 1960:  
Let the word go forth this time and place, to friend and foe alike, that the torch 
has been passed to a new generation of Americans born in this century, tempered 
by war, disciplined by a hard and bitter peace, proud of our ancient heritage and 
unwilling to witness or permit the slow undoing of those human rights to which 
this nation has always been committed and to which we are committed to at home 
and around the world.31  
Armed with both the power of their machines, industrial capacity, and new commitment 
to liberty, Americans were highly optimistic about the future. This optimism was also 
framed in the absence of pain in the context of America’s mini “utopia.”   
 That generation was reaping the rewards of the culmination of the works and 
labor of past generations, who as Lyndon Johnson remarked had, “for half a century we 
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labored to settle & to subdue a continent. For half a century we called upon unbounded 
invention & untiring industry to create an order of plenty for all our people.”32 This 
plenty was an also a way of saying that Americans had finally conquered nature and had 
reduced its danger into an extension of human utility. The once far off kingdom of air, 
sea, and mountains were now filled with U.S. war planes, battleships, and military 
installations. Mirroring the military domination was a private sector of industry and trade 
that eclipsed all previous economies in human history. Hunger and disease were 
conquered through the green revolution of high yields, and the development of cures for 
polio, smallpox, and malaria.33 In this epoch Americans had seemed to separate 
themselves from the once troubling states of hunger, disease, and misery. However, their 
absence created several reactions within American society during the post war era.    
 The post war economic boom and the abundance also created new anxieties. 
Within certain circles there grew a perceived weakness of character and spirit born of the 
vast industrialized American machines. At the same time there was also a beaming 
optimism and hubris that with new technology came more control over nature and with 
more control came another notch toward an abstract goal of progress: a goal that was 
utopian in nature. Utopia in fiction and social critique were presented as the accumulation 
of vast scientific and technological projects that created a land of plenty and comfort.34 
Human societies often tried to separate themselves from nature in different techno orders: 
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from the Christian order centered around the church, peaceful village, and orderly fields; 
to the enlightenment aesthetic of gardens, townships, and exploration; to the industrial 
landscape of dams, highways, factories, and suburban sprawl. These techno orders helped 
enforce a separation between human beings and nature that served as justifications for the 
social contract of the societies. They believe in God, they toil in the garden, they value 
the social contract because otherwise without them they will find themselves abandoned 
in an unmarked grave amidst wilderness and beasts. Thus, these techno orders powers 
came, in part, from their semblance toward for the preferred human states of neatness and 
order. Early sixties liberalism, perhaps, was where this illusion of the separation was at 
its highest.35 A time that had seemed impossible within past generations suffering from 
disease and discomfort, was now swept away by the magic of science. What was once 
make-believe, parody and satire had now nearly become reality.  
 The illusion was anchored by the Christian myth that began the first social order, 
and the first separation told through the biblical tale of Adam and Eve. It was in the first 
moments where Adam and Eve found themselves outside the Garden of Eden that the 
Christian idea of “nature” was born. Nature became what these societies perceive as a 
place in the absence of the guidance of the human hand to craft from its chaos something 
of value. This was the genesis of cultural ideas like that of wilderness, frontier, and nature 
which became a protagonist to human endeavor: as they could not exist without the 
countering protagonist agent like a farmstead, a church, or city. They existed in a world 
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that was not a human world. Inside it, according to the perception of the ancients, people 
became powerlessness, prone to the nihilistic cycles, rooted in the primal manifestations 
of might makes right in an intense fight for survival. In this wilderness humans were not 
at their strength but vulnerable to the wild animals.36 In western ideas of nature the 
concept of separation from this world is key to justify social orders, civilization, and in 
America’s liberal technocratic state it was at perhaps its greatest cultural strength.  
 The separation allowed very idealistic and romantic perceptions about nature to 
propagate without a bloody counter of physicality. In the Golden Age of the 1950s and 
1960s there were few, if any, pioneers suffering in heat and bloody toil to falsify the 
naïve idea of separation from ecology. Views of nature within America combined ideas 
of the natural world with American optimism that projected nature into a cultural view of 
“frontiers,” a far-off place of constructed fantasy, utopianism, and dreamy calls for 
nationalism. Writer Henry Luce in his influential piece The American Century called for 
America to become the herald for a new form of empire. An empire not based on 
conquest and authoritarianism but freedom, liberty, and a new global mandate to ensure 
these values for all people. As he stated, “it must be an internationalism of the people, by 
the people, and for the people.”37 Luce believed in American manifest destiny and 
described its conquest of the frontier as an integral part of this narrative toward a 
transcendent empire. Reworking this process into an idea that fit his conception of 
American internationalism he wrote:  
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Other nations can survive simply because they have endured so long sometimes 
with more and sometimes with less significance. But, this nation, conceived in 
adventure and dedicated to the progress of man – this nation cannot truly endure 
unless there courses strongly through its veins from Maine to California the blood 
of purpose and enterprise and high resolve… 
Throughout the 17th century & the 18th century and the 19th century, this continent 
teemed with manifold projects and magnificent purposes. Above them all and 
weaving them all together into the most exciting flag of all the world and of all 
history was the triumphed purpose of freedom.38 
Luce was part of a long line of American leaders who wished their country to 
adopt a unique mandate that offered the world liberty and hope. President Kennedy’s 
victory in 1960 was another step toward this mandate. President Kennedy’s cabinet 
would cleverly restate these ideals through icons and imagery of the American past such 
as the wild west and frontier to market to American voters a new energy within a broad 
set of policy goals titled the New Frontier. This New Frontier involved a series of 
economic and social goals, but without question the most important theme was the 
emphasis on American rediscovery of their identity as pioneers, explorers, and people of 
action.39  
 This moved away from the anxiety found in nuclear warfare and at the same time 
addressed the insecurity of the abundance society in America. By using past American 
mythological heroic imagery, already propped up by Hollywood John Wayne films, and 
popular cowboy iconography, many Americans were eager to take up President 
Kennedy’s internationalist call. Kennedy began preparing the ground for his landscape of 
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American action, and purpose in 1960 in the Los Angeles Coliseum where he said the 
following: 
For I stand tonight facing west on what was once the last frontier. From the lands 
that stretch 3,000 miles behind me, the pioneers of old gave up their safety their 
comfort and sometimes their lives to build a new world here in the West… But 
the problems are not all solved and the battles are all not won, and we stand today 
on the edge of a New Frontier – the frontier of the 1960s, a frontier of unfulfilled 
hopes and threats… for the harsh facts of the matter are that we stand on the 
frontier at a turning point in history.40 
In this turning point in history there were two sides. On one side were the forces of evil, a 
great eastern empire of communism the Soviet Union, and on the other side were the 
godly forces of liberal, capitalistic democracies, and Americans were to rediscover the 
energy to fight for this world order in Kennedy’s New Frontier. By extension of the Cold 
War rhetoric, the New Frontier became part of a military strategy titled “Flexible 
Response” which sought to combat communism with special forces.  
Popular attention shifted away from American Navy and Air Forces to the Green 
Berets and the army. While the Navy and Air Force housed titanic wonders such as the 
B-52 bomber, nuclear submarines and other pieces of American technological might, 
they were also subconsciously associated with nuclear annihilation. As President 
Kennedy spoke to West Point graduates in 1962 on the new hot spots in the Cold War 
such as Korea and Cuba, “No massive nuclear retaliation has been considered 
appropriate. This is another type of war new in its intensity, ancient in its origin – war by 
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guerrillas, subversives, insurgents, assassins, war by ambush instead of combat.”41 
President Kennedy understood that the population valued individual heroism, and the 
flagship for this shift came in the creation of a new special force. Kennedy saw within the 
Green Berets a romantic vision. These special forces embodied the American character, 
being both rough and noble warrior scholars, and dangerous men who traveled exotic 
wilds like the mythic American frontiersmen of old. They became the posters for the 
heroic action of Kennedy’s new frontier as Time magazine wrote in 1961 of the Green 
Berets, “Green Berets can remove an appendix, fire a foreign-made or obsolete gun, blow 
up a bridge, handle a bow and arrow, sweet talk some bread out of a native in his own 
language, fashion explosives out of chemical fertilizer, cut an enemy’s throat… or live 
off the land.”42  
 Historians would come to call this time Kennedy’s Camelot, a name which 
invoked hope, but also a more adult, and somber interpretation of the era as fairytale. 
During this era one of the great pitfalls of progress, the fear of civilization gone rampant, 
had seemingly been solved. American anxiety was forged into a spiritual mission of 
enlightening and historical purpose. President Kennedy offered a new frontier and a new 
“wilderness” to conquer: this one was largely metaphorical being made up of the general 
state of ignorance, poverty, and the larger fight against communism. America in this 
narrative would continue its myth by finishing what their ancestors had started by 
bringing civilization to replace wilderness. This message was popular in the technocratic 
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paradigm by intellectuals and regular citizens alike. As Philip Caputo remembered, 
“Once in a while I found flint arrowheads in the muddy creek bank. Looking at them, I 
would dream of that savage, heroic time and wish I had lived then, before America- a 
land of salesman and shopping centers… That is what I wanted, to find in a common 
place world a chance to live heroically. Having known nothing but security, comfort and 
peace I hungered for danger, challenges and violence.”43 Philip Caputo, Ron Kovic, Tim 
O’Brien and other voices of veterans would get their chance for danger as the situation in 
Vietnam worsened in 1962. Long before people imagined a hypnotic nightmare land of 
war, burning villages, spooky Viet Cong, and crazed GI’s with flamethrowers, the strange 
small country seemed to echo with adventurous potential 
Vietnam would remain an enigma to most Americans. Throughout the 1960s 
many viewed Vietnam as one among a legion of backward third world nations. Its alien 
interior was filled with innocent, but ignorant, and misguided peasantry: a place fitting to 
be on the front lines against communist insurgency. Hollywood would present Vietnam 
in this light in popular films such The Quiet American (1958) or China Gate (1957), films 
that delegitimized the North Vietnamese and framed the conflict in the American Cold 
War perspective of good vs evil.44 Military men were optimistic in the Kennedy era and 
approved of his supportive gestures toward the Army. But they still wanted a proving 
ground. They wanted a war to prove themselves to not only their president, but to their 
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fathers who had fought in World War II.45 As the situation worsened, South Vietnam 
would emerge as the proving grounds for American men like Ron Kovic, Tim O’Brien, 
Karl Marlantes, Philip Caputo. Alongside strategists and policy makers like secretary of 
State Robert McNamara, who saw Vietnam as an opportunity for their own designs of 
nation building.  
 In the brimming competition for influence between America and the Soviet 
Union, Vietnam had been divided up by Cold War foreign policy. Infested by agents, 
spies, and diplomatic representatives of each power the land seemed ripe for a future 
conflict. However, for Americans, Vietnam had no prior history, it was merely a place 
concocted in fantasies of adventurous frontiers and made to be foil to modern 
civilization: appearing on the periphery of an unknown frontier of the Cold War with no 
expectation for future disaster. But Vietnam had a long history that predated many 
civilizations. Archeological evidence suggests that the first people who entered the 
valleys and coastal plains of Vietnam entered the region some 15,000 to 30,000 years 
ago. Vietnamese legends spun tales of the yearly flooding, the indomitable mountains, 
and jungles as home to fairies, spirits, heroes and ancestors. The land was full of shrines 
and graves of their ancestors that had in their own way found ways to control nature and 
build an agrarian civilization.46 Over their history these people created a legacy of 
defeating powerful empires like the Chinese, Mongols, and the French, using their natural 
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ecosystems of triple canopy jungle, mountainous terrain, highlands and deltas to tire out 
their enemies in brutal guerrilla warfare.47  
 South Vietnam lies against the China Sea stretching to be about the size of 
California. Its capital, Saigon, located below the immense Mekong Delta, lies some 500 
miles south from Hanoi, the capital of North Vietnam. In South Vietnam, 80% of the 16 
million people lived on 40% of the land. Another 40% of the land was uninhabited; 
dominated by scrub brush, elephant grass, swamps, and jungle. Thin strips of arable land 
and lowlands clung to the coast along the length of the country, except at the Annamite 
mountain range, which cut into the country below the city of Hue, and eventual settled in 
the area known as the Central Highlands.48 In the Northwest province near the 
demilitarized zone, the Annamite Mountain range reaches heights of 8,000 feet and is 
often covered by triple canopy cover and lush, thick fauna. This range extends along the 
back of the country like a spine, only broken by the Central Highlands where the 
mountains break down into a wide plateau of steep mountain passes and dense jungle. 
This plateau lies in the center of the country below the strategic city of Hue that 
connected South Vietnam’s north and southern portion. The foreboding Annamite 
mountains are just a small subdivision of the titanic Himalayan mountain range whose 
peaks stretch from Vietnam all the way to Pakistan. These mountains birthed the great 
rivers of Vietnam such as the Yangtze River in the north and the Red and Mekong rivers 
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in the south, waterways which coursed through the lowlands and coastal plain, and 
created deltas such as the immense Mekong Delta.49 
It was in the Mekong Delta that American military advisors would first encounter 
Vietnam’s first test of ecology. Through 1962 through 1964 the war remained a fantasy 
of adventure, and Americans’ contact with the harsh ecological reality did not 
immediately dampen these feelings.50 Optimism came from an assumption the war would 
be over soon, and many in the military wanted a piece of the action before it ended. As 
General Charles Timmes, a veteran of D-Day spoke, “It isn’t much of a war but it’s the 
only war we’ve got, so enjoy it.”51 The eagerness by American captains to camp with 
their South Vietnam allies, to go out on patrol, and the general feelings of empathy and 
welcome experienced toward the Vietnamese and Americans reflected the dreamy start to 
a grand campaign. For Americans in these dreamy years they imagined hunting Viet-
Cong in the Delta would be like fighting Indians in the old American west. The military 
jargon reflected the boyish enthusiasm to equate the past with the current war in Vietnam. 
Names for operations were ripped right from 17th and 18th century vernacular with names 
such as “Daniel Boone,” “Cochise” and “Crazy Horse.” These names created a narrative 
link between the past, and this new war of chasing communist guerrillas into a vast 
swampy wilderness with APC’s and helicopters, manned by their grinning American 
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technicians and sergeants leading the awestruck and grateful Vietnamese to victory.52 But 
as time went by, the real situation became clearer even as the situation on the ground 
grew more chaotic and murkier.  
It was not their father’s war. There were no stationary targets to destroy like 
factories, no precise territory to conquer like Paris and Berlin, and often no visible enemy 
to fight like the Germans or Japanese regulars. The air was thick with heat and humidity 
causing the thick hairy American bodies to sweat and wear down in exhaustion. 
Americans came with expectations: they would get their hands dirty, feel the mud in their 
socks, and feel the beating hot rays of the sun on their necks. However, the experience of 
pain quickly overtook the early charms of fatigue and adventure. The reality did not meet 
the opaque intellectual conception of nation building, nor the popular cultural conception 
of “roughing it” in some wilderness.  
Vietnam had emerged as a cultural and historical parallel with past American 
struggles against wilderness such as the Wild West. The story was supposed to have 
ended like that of their ancestors: in overcoming wilderness and defeating it. However, 
the ecological reality was the first to disregard this dream of transcendental purpose. As 
time went on the men on the frontlines in the Mekong Delta and central highlands such as 
the sergeants and advisors began to feel the effects of something in the air, a thing that 
the French in the previous war had called la cafard, a sickness of the spirit that sapped 
the strength of the large American bodies unused to such heat.53 Moving all day in heavy 
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gear and chasing an elusive foe turned out to be a great challenge. Unlike some 
Hollywood jungle landscape that had a cache of communists at the end of it, there usually 
was little to see for their efforts. While Philip Caputo entered the war in the north near the 
DMZ in Da Nang, he summed up what many began to feel in the Delta in the early years 
of 1962. “The novelty of our surroundings wore off,” he wrote, “the lack of action and 
the long days of staring at that alien landscape: a lovely landscape, yes. But after a while 
all that jungle green became as monotonous as the beige of the desert or the white of the 
artic.”54 
The Delta transformed from an American ideal of wilderness of adventure and 
bravery into the reality of a harsh ecosystem breathing a world of misery. The Mekong 
Delta is an immense floodplain stretching in a southernly arc underneath the capital of 
South Vietnam, Saigon, over some 15,000 square miles. Canals crisscross the plains in a 
patchwork pattern with some places reaching a depth of 15 meters. Daily temperatures 
routinely reached 90 degrees with high humidity. In this maze of fauna and water more 
than 80% of South Vietnam’s total peasantry lived in scattered villages. Journalist David 
Halberstam when observing operations in the Mekong Delta in 1962 would remark, 
‘when I first went to the Delta, I saw that this was what the war was all about.”55 What 
Halberstam saw was the first tremor in the web of American confidence: the unnerving 
competency of the Viet-Cong, the lack of morale in the Army of the Republic of 
Vietnam, or ARVN for short, soldiers, and the quality of warfare without any measurable 
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progress. As one American officer said in the Delta, “This is what it was like, hot and 
frustrating and unrewarding.”56  
Nature was quickly becoming the central orientation of discovering the credibility 
gap: a gap between the formal statements made by the United States Military and 
Washington, and their lack of imagination, and overreliance on technology to provide 
what they perceived as a quick fix to the Vietnam problem. Assistant to the president, 
W.W. Rostow suggested in a memo sent to President Kennedy, “the sending to Vietnam 
of a research & development & military hardware team which would explore with 
General McGarr… the various techniques & gadgets now available or being explored 
might be relevant & useful in the Vietnam operation.”57 Ironically, despite the personal 
desire for individual heroism and glory, the industrial state and its abundance of 
technology was still the primary means of addressing the growing crisis in Vietnam. 
Chemical weapons, advanced halftrack troop carriers like the APC, helicopters, fighter 
jets, and thousands of weapons for AVRN soldiers were poured into the country during 
the early period of 1962-1964, and this represented the low point of what would become 
a massive campaign of bombing, shelling, and chemical spraying of Vietnam’s 
landscape. It was the large bureaucracy of false progress reports and the overuse of 
technology further widened the credibility gap between soldiers and their leaders.   
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The credibility gap was many things. It was the elemental disparity between the 
progress reports, the perception of technological power equaling victory, the American 
generals’ opinions, the official press releases made by Washington, and then reported by 
mainstream news outlets that denied the chaotic conflict in Vietnam which even as early 
as 1964 created wide dissonance between soldier and their leaders. As veteran Colin 
Powell remembered of his experience on the ground in Vietnam: 
Secretary McNamara… made a visit to South Vietnam. Every quantitative 
measurement, he concluded, after forty-eight hours there, shows that we are 
winning the war. Measure it and it has meaning. Yet, nothing I had witnessed… 
indicated we were beating the Viet Cong. Beating them? Most of the time we 
could not even find them.”58  
This simple observation guided the primary metaphor and symbolism of Vietnam in 
much of the critique, protest, and counter-culture movements that came later in the 
decade.  
As American soldiers were discovering during 1962-1964 in the Mekong Delta 
the ideal of nature as adventuring in frontier could not match the hellish reality of wading 
waist deep in sludge through a humid environment, of winning a hill each day and losing 
it at night, or finding a blown off foot and calling it another enemy body. Previous 
American wars contextualized the pain of cold and heat in a context of “the front.” 
Vietnam highlighted pain as a mundane, demeaning, and directionless experience part of 
being “in country.” It was a frightening reminder of mortality and the fragility of the 
human body. As environmental historian Patricia Limerick explained, “Nature is on one 
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count a reminder of the individual’s own biological vulnerability.”59 This kind of 
reminder would pass over the heads of state like Robert McNamara, General 
Westmoreland, and others who could not see the physicality of the land war developing 
before them. 
Secretary of State Robert McNamara, who in 1962 after a brief visit in Vietnam 
said infamously, “every quantitative measurement we have shows that were winning this 
war.”60 If President Kennedy represented the symbol behind the dreamy age of Camelot, 
then McNamara was its magical Merlin. Robert McNamara hailed from the afterglow of 
World War II and the industrial scale of logistics that help the Allies win that war. 
McNamara preached the “Fordian” model, a method of identifying a problem or goal and 
working to create a system to fix it at maximum efficiency. Believing whole heartedly 
that the problem in Vietnam  – and any problem for that matter – could be solved by 
systematical methods, monitoring progress, analytics, and industrial output, McNamara 
embraced this theory to solve the Vietnam riddle.61 Using these magics of the 
technocratic enterprise McNamara took a complex situation and boiled it down into his 
industrial theory that required updates of paper and graphs to show progress. Numbers of 
hamlets built, number of peasants registered, number of Viet-Cong killed, number of 
patrols run. Numbers became the preferred tool of the state to reduce the immense 
complexity of Vietnam to something identifiable and measurable.  
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 In 1963 after the Assassination of President Kennedy in Dallas, newly sworn in 
President Lyndon Johnson under advice from his cabinet and the new commander of 
American forces in South Vietnam General William Westmorland ordered the 
deployment of marine elements into South Vietnam. The move came after attacks against 
airports in Da Nang and Saigon as well as bases within South Vietnam’s hinterland. 
Vulnerable against Viet-Cong ground forces and with the ARVN still largely 
incompetent, Johnson ordered the deployment of two marine battalions on February 22, 
1965. Over the next 3 years operations would be handled with a degree of purpose and 
resolution as commanders and soldiers believed they were fighting a just war.62 11 
million Americans served in uniform during the Vietnam War. 2.8 million were sent to 
Vietnam, but only 10% of them would fight in the enigmatic “bush” as line infantry. 
Many came to the war to escape poverty, because they were drafted, serve their country, 
or to find purpose. Some 8 million would sign up during this time, and millions more 
were drafted.63  
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CHAPTER TWO  
DECENT INTO THE “WILDERNESS” 
 
“No country is so wild and difficult, but men will make it a theatre of war.” 
– Ambrose Bierce.64 
 
 Arrival to Vietnam for American soldiers came in four frames according to 
veteran James Gilliam. The first frame was landing either by plane or boat. An 
experience that for new arrivals was a mixture of terrifying, beautiful, and boring. James 
Gilliam personally described the landing as “imitation of a falling stone.” Next was the 
heat. The heat became a staple of the experience in the Vietnam War. Except for the air-
conditioned HQ’s in Saigon and other American military bases, it was impossible to 
escape the high temperatures. James Gilliam described the heat as “a malevolent being 
determined to kill us all before we could fire a shot.” The next step was taking a series of 
battered buses, being transported to various centers, being given their orders, some gear, 
and awaiting further transportation to their assignments. The bus hemmed the men in a 
din of claustrophobic heat as they looked at a strange people and immense poverty 
through grime-covered windows shielded by a wiry screen to protect the bus’s passengers 
from grenades. The final frame was combat. Not all experienced it equally, nor did it 
come at the same time, but for the 10% of the 2.8 million U.S. soldiers in Vietnam who 
served frontline duty, combat was inevitable.65 
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 These frontline soldiers would be part of General William Westmoreland’s 
“limited plan” to defeat the Viet-Cong forces given the diplomatic limitations set by 
Washington. Unable to directly invade North Vietnam which President Johnson feared 
would start a war with China, General Westmoreland conceived of a war of attrition as he 
said with some bitterness in his memoir.  
In any case what alternative was there to a war of attrition? A ground invasion of 
North Vietnam was out, for the U.S. National policy was not to conquer North 
Vietnam, but to eliminate the insurgency inside South Vietnam and President 
Johnson had stated publicly that he would not broaden the war. … Meanwhile I 
had to get on with meeting the crisis within South Vietnam and only by seeking, 
fighting and destroying the enemy could that be done.66 
General Westmoreland would attempt to accomplish this through three stages. The first 
was to secure various enclaves or base areas – a plan like the hamlet program – and 
secure them with infantry. These enclaves would be bases of operation for infantry 
patrols who would conduct a traditional ground war that Westmoreland called “Search 
and Destroy.” These patrols would be the lure for larger North Vietnamese Army and 
Viet Cong units who would be drawn under the umbrella of American artillery and 
airpower. Stage two would see offensive operations including deep patrolling with 
AVRN forces in the hinterlands and mountains for Viet-Cong bases, regiments and 
supply caches. This phase would disrupt enemy movement and teach the ARVN how to 
fight proper warfare. At the same time the goal was to keep the enemy away from 
population centers along the coast like the cities of Hue, Da-Nang, and Saigon. Stage 
three would begin a slow withdrawal of American soldiers and the arrival of ARVN to 
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take over security of South Vietnam. This final phase would see Americans only offering 
logistical and special operations support.67 If all went to plan, Westmoreland and the war 
planners envisioned their enemies becoming mincemeat in perfectly orchestrated killing 
fields of firepower, and the war ending as soon as 1966.  
 In conjunction with ground operations, the United States Air force launched daily 
airstrikes at targets in South Vietnam and North Vietnam’s industry – also called sorties – 
alongside massive bombing and chemical spraying campaigns that would begin in 1965 
and continue until the war’s end in 1973. Operations such as Rolling Thunder and 
Operation Ranch Hand, one of chemical warfare and the other the start of a massive 
bombing campaigns, were integral to American strategy. These efforts of America’s 
techno-empire were expected to be the war’s deciding factors, as the Vietnamese would 
be grounded up in a charnel house of explosive extravagance. Whatever failure existed in 
terms of strategy; the American logistics were a miracle of industry. Historian Harry 
Summers described the feat of arming, feeding, clothing, moving, and supplying over 10 
million men halfway around the world “incredible.”68  
As manpower and weapons poured in Vietnam and operations began in earnest 
General Westmoreland would watch confidently as his plan took shape across the 
country, from search and destroy operations in the jungle of the central highlands and the 
canals of the Mekong Delta, to air sorties in Laos and Cambodia, and constant patrolling 
of the Vietnamese countryside. All the while air sorties dropped bombs in the Vietnam 
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hinterlands included the passes in the Central Highlands, in the wilderness of Laos and 
Cambodia, and on industrial targets in North Vietnam. Chemical spraying of Agent 
Orange disrupted Viet Cong food supplies and their cover as the machinery of the United 
States grounded their enemy to dust. This at least, was the perception.  
 On the ground for frontline soldiers like Philip Caputo, Tim O’Brien or James 
Gilliam the war had a different tone than the excessive confidence expressed by their 
generals. Whether it was new army companies in the Central Highlands, or in the 
Mekong Delta, or the Marines protecting the DMZ and the airport in Da-Nang, they all 
entered Vietnam’s frontlines in earnest between 1966-1968. As they unloaded from 
trucks and helicopters on far-off bases or frontline outposts, the reality of the situation hit 
them. Men reached the front and discovered that in fact no so-called front even existed. 
They operated from camps in the middle of large areas of operation they would then 
patrol in search and destroy operations. The heat continued to wear on the new arrivals. 
As veteran Tom Magedenz recalled, “It was so hot we could wring our T-shirts every 5 
minutes or so. The sweat just ran and heat enveloped part of our bodies.”69 As weeks 
passed and men went on their first patrols, the pain and drudgery of the war revealed 
itself. Hauling nearly 70 pounds of gear in mountainous or heavy jungle canopy in humid 
100-degree heat was sheer agony. As historian James Ebert wrote on the frontline 
experience, “the reality that typified the existence of the field soldier in Vietnam was not 
so much combat with enemy forces as it was the day to day hardships, the fatigue and 
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frustration of living and coping with that harsh and hostile environment.”70 Search and 
destroy operations were less about efficient, clever movements than the blind groping of 
exhausted men through difficult country.  
 The search and destroy operations did not go well. American soldiers slowly 
searched 1000-meter grid squares that appeared on maps in places like A Shau Valley 
and The Iron Triangle near Saigon. Westmoreland’s strategists did not see the hacking 
through thick foliage of elephant grass, vines, bush, and trees, in the jungle or how his 
soldiers’ sight was limited to 10 feet at times in the thick jungle. For the American 
command structure, their only link to these ecological realities was a map. In the south 
these maps held symbols of rice paddies and jungles and in the north the maps held tight 
symbols that showed the mountainous jungle terrain. Intersecting lines of supposed 
enemy troop movements and areas of operation colored their surface, but for the grunts 
these maps were deeply flawed. As veteran lieutenant Frank Boicca said in his fictional 
retelling of his experience in Cu Chai near Hue. “The S3 Shop – command – would look 
at a map, pick out a spot they wanted you at and tell you to move. But up here… they 
look at a map and tell you to move the same distance – on the map - and don’t realizes 
that you’re climbing up and down some of the steepest jungle in the world… and a 
hundred meters in mountainous terrain is infinity.”71 Even on flat ground walking into the 
jungle for the first time was a disorientating experience, and most men never got used to 
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it. As Philip Caputo remembered during an operation near the Annamite mountain range 
during a search and destroy operation:  
It was like walking from brilliant sunshine into a darkened room. Though the 
dense canopy overhead the light fell in splintered shafts, bathing everything below 
in greenish twilight. No wind blew. The air was heavy & wet & the jungle 
smelled like a damp cellar. We could hear things slithering and rustling in the 
underbrush. We could hear them but not see them. It was difficult to see much of 
anything through the vines & trees, tangled together in a silent, savage struggle 
for light and air. A war of plant life.72 
The idea of an invisible foe was reinforced by an operational tactic called the mad 
minute. This was when the commanding officer of a more remote post would quickly 
muster all soldiers around the base perimeter and give the order for all to blindly and 
furiously fire their weapons into the unknown of the surrounding jungle for at least 60 
seconds. It was hoped this would scare off approaching Viet-Cong ambushes, but more 
often than not, it revealed how the lack of visibility forged deep fears of phantom enemy 
movement. 
Moving across these landscapes, Americans searched for an enemy who often 
never revealed itself in force. It was an existence of marching themselves mechanically 
up hills, and down dusty roads, or through dense foliage. Meanwhile their bodies were 
assaulted by booby traps, heat, sharp elephant grass, leeches, frequent cases of malaria, 
and bouts of heat exhaustion. A big day of moving for these patrols was considered 15 
kilometers. The lack of enemy contact eclipsed the thoughts of American soldiers and 
generated feelings of frustration. As veteran Vernon Janick remembered, “We never got 
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hit by anything big, it was usually just a lot of Viet-Cong. And they operated on their 
own as one or two here or there. We had constant booby traps and snipers… you could 
never find them or see them or nothing. You would get up move a-little ways and then 
bam, bam.”73 As casualties in the American ranks rose due to these traps, ambushes, and 
heat exhaustions Westmoreland would incessantly urge Washington for more and more 
troops.  
Meanwhile the politburo in Hanoi took advantage of Washington’s plodding 
overconfidence in their strategy that emphasized mechanical weaponry like airpower, and 
between 1965-1966 and 1968-1975 shifted tactics away from set piece battles that 
favored American fire power: and instead, they focused on drawing out the war for as 
long as possible in what a Vietnamese veteran who fought the Americans Truong Nhu 
Tong, called “fighting while talking and talking while fighting.” This saying represented 
the Vietnamese strategy to defeat an enemy who was technological and militarily more 
powerful than they were, but could not match their intuitive use of their geography, their 
spirit, or the enterprise of total war under which all of North Vietnamese society took 
part, as well as major resistance cells and pockets of support in the South.74 The entire 
population was involved in rebuilding bridges, paving roads, working in factories, 
participating in defense drills, studying socialist revolution, and serving in the army. The 
entire population was geared toward the final victory against the American imperialist. 
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The most important piece of flooding these weapons and people into the fight in the 
South was the creation of the infamous Ho Chi Minh trail.  
Located within the vast mountainous jungles of Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam, 
the Ho Chi Minh trail extended hundreds of miles as the logistical backbone of Hanoi’s 
war effort. Made of thousands of individual roads, the trail constantly expanded and 
widened as the war went on. Its construction began in 1959 by early pioneers of 
Vietnamese resistance cells regrouping after the establishment of the 17th parallel during 
the Geneva accords. The original paths were small and the time it took to complete its 
full journey took 6 months crossing over a vast wilderness of mountains, jungle, 
wetlands, tigers, snakes, rain, and malaria. Over time Hanoi increased the work force 
from tens of thousands to eventually hundreds of thousands of laborers. These included 
large youth groups of men and women who worked in difficult conditions to widen the 
trail and repair it as rain and mudslides constantly created damage and blockages. As 
American bombs began to fall on this large area of Laos and Cambodia in 1965, the 
danger multiplied greatly. However, by 1968 the trail had become nearly impervious to 
air attacks. Even as early as 1966 the trail consisted of too many interlocking pieces and 
would only continue to grow despite incessant American air strikes and bombing 
campaigns. By 1974 with a workforce well over 100,000 men and women, the Ho Chi 
Minh trail was a vast network of roads, bases, hospitals, vehicle depots, ammunition 
dumps, fueling stations and even anti-air defense stations.75 
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The trail was the heart of the war and it became the central experience for an 
entire generation of Vietnamese. For the Vietnamese it became the opposite of the 
American experience of Indo-china’s environment. The trail became sacred geography to 
the Vietnamese. It embodied the spirit of Ho Chi Minh to reunite North and South 
Vietnam. Labor on the trail was done with a spirit of deep comradery and purpose, and 
despite facing B-52 carpet bombing, phantom jets dropping napalm, rockets, and bombs, 
and diseases such as malaria, dysentery, and yellow fever, the Vietnamese never gave up 
in the trail’s maintenance.76 Death and pain in this Vietnamese “wilderness” unlike the 
American situation was given meaning, and thus a mental reinforcement occurred that 
help counter the often horrendous conditions by the trail’s workers. The trail’s success 
represented the energy behind the Vietnamese cause. It was this disparity in spirit and 
purpose that became one of the primary cultural mechanism that disrupted the American 
myth and consensus. But, amid intense jungle warfare in 1966 and 1968, this breaking of 
spirit had not yet entered the American mainstream consciousness. It would appear with a 
vengeance in the “baffling” Tet offensive televised for the American public in 1968.  
As the war stretched into 1967 American soldiers died and became maimed by an 
ever-increasing landscape of booby traps and mines. In the Vietnam war, amputations 
and lower limb injuries were 300% higher than the previous two American wars.77 By 
1967, booby traps typified the American grunt experience with over 1,000 being killed in 
1966, and 6 months into 1967 over 6,000 Americans became victim to these devices. By 
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the war’s height in 1968, 25% of American combat deaths would be a result of mines and 
traps.78 This cut and deeply disturbed the psychological stability of American soldiers. 
Their sense of safety was eroded away by fear of mines, an ironic statement perhaps 
given the war, but accurate in the context the war was fought. Most trips into “the bush” 
went uneventfully with nearly 90% ending without enemy contact. Finding objectives 
like supply caches or enemy patrols were also rare, and men saw little direct reward for 
their efforts other than new skin lesions forming jungle rot, red cuts from sharp elephant 
grass, trench foot, stingy sweat, and dehydration. As the prolific writer veteran Tim 
O’Brien wrote of a fictional platoon on patrol, “they plodded along slowly dumbly, 
leaning forward against the heat unthinking, all blood and bone, simple grunts, soldering 
with their legs, toiling up the hills… just humping one step and then the next..”79 Then 
suddenly the sleepy exhaustion was broken by a violent crack and the sound of wet 
smacks of the patrol dropping to the wet muddy jungle floor.  
There was no rhyme or reason to the violence. No town taken, no hill conquered, 
no territory won, and rarely any enemy bodies spotted or killed. The trap just went off 
when a foot or leg applied pressure to the trigger or broke the taunt wire holding back the 
explosive’s energy. Sometimes it was a bouncing betty, a stolen American claymore, a 
“toe popper” made of shotgun shells, or sometimes primitive punji sticks covered in 
human feces that drove a bamboo spike through feat and bone. Vietnam’s violence in this 
way was both deeply intimate, painful, and incredible in its shortness. It often left the 
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survivors in a rage as one veteran recounted, “We went into the jungle totally different 
from that moment on. We walked in there looking to kill, looking to get back at what had 
been done to us.”80 More than anger, which could only be sustained for so long, there was 
a deeper and more acidic constant fear of the mines with men unsure which step would be 
their “last step,” a phrase that eventually became a common form of the American 
soldier’s vernacular that euphemistically reflected the horrifying idea of stepping on 
something that removed genitals, legs, arms, and spilled innards. As one veteran 
remembered, “Nothing happened but the fear, man, the fear, man.”81 The fear represented 
a problem of strategy, but also grew in the environment that subtly played at men’s 
primal fears. As a veteran remembered, ‘He – the Viet Cong – could be 10 feet away and 
you’d never know it. He’s right back down in the ground and you don’t even know where 
the shot came from.”82 
Booby traps were just one of many troubling problems for frontline soldiers. 
Snipers hid perfectly camouflaged in trees and with deadly accuracy they could pin entire 
platoons down for hours in the baking sun. The sun, like all of Vietnam’s environment, 
seemed to mirror the brutal, yet meaningless, narrative of the suffering American 
soldiers. The alien faces and villages of the Vietnamese also infuriated and disturbed 
Americans who couldn’t seem to relate to these people, and their perception, of the 
Vietnamese strange stoic demeanor. Soon, what trust may have existed in the first weeks 
of American deployment evaporated as many men turned to openly hate the Vietnamese 
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and likewise the Vietnamese responded with equally antagonistic emotions of apathy or 
anger. As one peasant told a Newsweek reporter in 1968 in the coastal enclave of Da 
Nang, “I don’t know who will win the war,” he said, “but I miss the bamboo of my 
village and the tombs of my parents. I don’t worry about who will lead the country.”83 
The peasantry was not just apathic, but active actors in a war that squeezed them between 
American suspicion and Viet-Cong pressure to house and feed them. Did a peasant tell 
the Americans which trails are mined? What then? Perhaps his family would be taken by 
the South Vietnam police for more interrogation, maybe the Viet Cong would find out 
and kill him? The Americans in turn wondered if the peasant knew anything, and what 
they weren’t telling them. 
Tim O’Brien called this “provoking madness,” a term that described how the war 
was fought and the dissonance by command to ignore the reality of the ground war. Men 
became described by O’Brien as “aimless, irritated monsters, with short tempers, and 
even shorter trigger fingers.”84 O’Brien and many other veterans were not only relaying 
the war’s dizzying effect on their mental state, but also were preparing the reader and 
audience for the reasoning – or lack thereof – for the numerous cases of massacre and 
violence against civilian targets. Anger sometimes was released by calling in an airstrike 
against a sniper position, seeing the falling warheads and napalm canisters generated 
immense feelings of power.85 Other feelings of power came from the various artifacts of 
American power and comfort like the helicopter. As Philip Caputo remembered, “the 
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helicopters had made it seem familiar. Being Americans, we were comfortable with 
machines, but with the aircraft gone we were struck by the utter strangeness of this rank 
and rotted wilderness.”86 Here we see a marked separation as Caputo referred to the 
alienation he felt toward the “wilderness” around him. Even as he wrote of the comfort 
offered by machines these same devices would become sources of great insecurity and 
doubt among many writers and veterans.   
Historian James Wright wrote, “Vietnam had no benchmarks remotely 
comparable to those of the army sweeping from Normandy and to Paris in the Summer of 
1944. There were no headlines shouting of territories won, of happy villagers cheering 
their liberation. There was no iconic flag raising such as Iwo Jima in 1945.”87 Instead the 
Vietnam War became a metaphor that took on a narrative took on themes of nihilism, 
disillusionment, and apocalypse. This was usually depicted in a story of corruption and 
transformation within an ecological “wilderness.” It was a transformation of bright, 
romantic boys marching off to war who then changed within the wilderness into nihilistic 
killers or apathetic warriors. Another view was deeply nihilistic that saw in the simple 
pain and suffering a madness where the soldier’s death without context or meaning 
created a gap of purpose within traditional perceptions of sacrifice. This kind of death in 
the tradition of Christianity and the west mirrored the death of an animal: a creature 
perishing without a history or purpose. Another narrative resonated power bridging a 
supernatural resource of primal energy into the Vietnam landscape. Giving power to the 
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brutal imponderableness to the trees, fauna, animals, and sounds. Popular memoirs 
related this narrative through their prose as seen here in Philip Caputo’s description of 
patrol:  
Patrol had the nightmare quality which characterized most small unit operations 
of the war. The trail looped and twisted and led nowhere. The company seemed to 
marching into a vacuum, haunted by a presence intangible yet real, a sense of 
being surrounded by something we could not see, it was the inability to see that 
vexed us most in that lies the jungles power to cause fear: it blinds. It arouses the 
same instinct that makes us apprehensive of places like attics and dark alleys.88 
With use of words like “intangible,” “haunted,” and “twisted” landscapes, Caputo is 
relating a direct physical causation to fears like the inability to see. The deep primal fears 
whispering danger to the human psyche. This was a world of irrationalism and 
perceptions of ancient human nature and heritage that fought desperately in far off 
wilderness to survive.  
The war for frontline soldiers became a battle against nature itself as Philip 
Caputo said, “it was the land that resisted us, the land, the jungle and the sun.”89 Many 
motifs of Vietnam’s War stories followed this “heart of darkness” narrative. As Joseph 
Conrad wrote in his work Heart of Darkness, “Land in the swamp, march through the 
woods, and in some inland past feel the savagery. The utter savagery, had closed around 
him, all the mysterious life of the wilderness that stirs in the forest, in the jungles, in the 
havens of wild men… And it has a fascination too, that goes to work on him. The 
fascination with the abomination.”90 Philip Beidler, a professor of American literature 
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who is considered a founder of Vietnam War studies, said “Out there, in Vietnam. 
‘Beyond’ is to run the risk of cutting free from whatever it once was that defined 
humanity and even worse, perhaps never being able to get it back again in it.”91   
 In the Vietnam War memoirs, the literary and symbolic themes related a feeling 
of nihilism highlighting the human experience as nothing more than an animal. Tim 
O’Brien wrote in his book The Things They Carried about patrol.  
…toiling up the hills and down the paddies and across the river and up again and 
down: just humping, one step and then the next and then another, but no volition, 
no will, because it was automatic, it was anatomy, and the war was entirely a 
matter of posture and carriage, the hump was everything-g a kind of inertia, a kind 
of emptiness, a dullness of desire and of intellect and conscious and hope and 
human sensibility. Their principles were in their feet. Their calculations were 
biological.92 
Nature in this narrative was evil and nihilistic. It was a place without meaning and 
without meaning the humanity of narrative is pulled out and stripped down to a series of 
random chronicles. An experience of this randomness was displayed in the story of 
Veteran Paul Meringolo:  
We’d been going all morning and all afternoon and probably covered 7-8 miles. 
Then all the sudden, one of the men in the company stepped on a mine. He was 
carrying a LAW. A LAW is a modern version of a bazooka. This particular fellow 
had been carrying this LAW sort of strapped over his shoulder when he stepped 
on the mine, the mine engaged the LAW & the rocket fired & blew off part of his 
head. He was killed, obviously. There you are all day sort of going along. You are 
getting tired, exhausted from the heat, exhausted from moving along, checking, 
wondering if you are going to run into something. By the middle of the afternoon 
the tiredness has taken over your body and all the sudden something dramatic like 
this happens and it just sort of unnerves you. We called a medevac chopper and 
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they took away the guy’s body and we just started walking again. It was like a 
surreal existence.93 
The narrative was taken away and what they were left with is reality: a random series of 
chronicles toward a violent and surreal death.  
 The American historical context of a post war “Eden” created a deep reaction 
against this experience in the Vietnam war. The experience of animal fear and animal 
vulnerability in ecology, along with the symbolic defeat of American machines 
represented a harsh critique of the American enterprise. Volunteer soldiers, students, 
draftees, and anti-war activists along with others came to view America not as a rich and 
fulfilling civilization, but instead, a hypocritical decadent empire reaching its peak. In 
part the reason for this was the difficulty in the Vietnam war to find any coherent 
narration that created a deep cognitive dissonance in American society.  
Past narrations of wars such as World War II put soldier’s death in a context of 
strategy, advance, and ultimate victory. Men marched to a hill and took it and then 
marched forward. As journalist David Halberstam evoked through a veteran of D-Day in 
his fictional work One Hot Day:  
We didn’t know how simple it was, and good we had it. Sure, we walked, but in a 
straight line. Boom, Normandy beaches, and then you set off for Paris and Berlin. 
Just like that… All you needed was a compass and good sense. But here you walk 
in a god damn circle and then you go home and then you go out the next day and 
wade through a circle and then you go home and the next day you go out and 
reverse the circle and then you go home and the next day you go out and reverse 
the circle you did before, erasing it. Every day the circle gets bigger and 
emptier.94 
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For the average soldier, the lack of clarity defined the war for them. As Tim 
O’Brien said in his book The Things They Carried, “for the common soldier, war had the 
feel – the spiritual texture of a great ghostly fog, thick and permeant…”95 Talking later 
about the war, an anonymous CIA operative related, “I’m grateful I went to Vietnam in 
the position I went because I knew what was going on. I read the cables. When there was 
a new offensive or a new strategy, I knew what it was, and I could relate it to what was 
happening in the village. But I knew grunts – the poor bastards jumped out of helicopters 
onto hot LZ’s and didn’t even know where the fuck they were…”96 He contrasted the 
man in the valley perspective vs the man on the hill. Both perspectives were flawed- one 
relating to bitter survival, and the other living in comfort and dissociated with the reality 
of the war. The loss of any kind of meaningful trust between the common soldiers and 
high command would signify a new trend of anti-authoritarianism and deep skepticism 
that would not just stay in the jungles of Vietnam but transferred to the American 
heartland and became a piece of its deep disillusionment with previously perceived 
paternal institutions like the government and military. A new disbelief in a system that 
had grown bulky and opaque in a empire of logistics.  
 American commanders in Saigon and their army of logistical officers, sergeants, 
clerks, cooks, bureaucrats, statisticians, surveillance operatives, intelligence operatives, 
and drivers were part of a system that was built only to accept progress reports. A system 
that was a carryover from the technocratic American state, as General Harkins who in 
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1962 spoke of three M’s as the keys to victory: men, money, and material. Journalist Neil 
Sheehan wrote that this culture, “had replaced insights, maneuver, and flexibility.”97 
Through 1964-1968, Westmoreland commanded two powerful armies. One was a 
machine army of helicopters, jets, and bombers, and the other a vast kingdom of paper. 
Graphs and charts detailed every operation, every Viet-Cong killed, body counts, sorties 
run, tons of bombs used, patrols completed, enemy supply caches destroyed, targets – be 
they a factory or village hooch - destroyed. Without territory to claim this was the only 
way to gauge success.98 But this did not match the reality of the ground war or the 
decision-making that typified a common soldier’s daily existence. Eventually these men 
developed a popular slang to characterize those in the back lines referring to them 
disparagingly as the REMF: “rear echelon mother fuckers.” As veteran James Gilliam 
recalled, this was “a man who lived somewhere safe like a base camp, and treated grunts 
like they were practically the enemy when his comfort was compromised.”99 Another 
veteran, Karl Marlantes, recalled a moment that put this dissonance between grunt and 
command in full view:  
Unknown to us, someone in Da Nang or Saigon was putting the final touches on a 
plan that called for the opening of a new firebase on top of a certain mountain 
located in a certain area. Now in the “area” is relative. To someone in Da Nang or 
Saigon, with large scale maps, one finger width covers a lot of ground, and our 
company was only a finger widths away. From our scale maps we were 16 finger 
widths, as the crow flies… in one day, humping from dawn to dark we made 
about 2 and a half finger widths. It is impossible to convey to a staff officer who 
has never had to watch his hands blister away from having to hack his way 
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through thick jungle with a machete just how slowly you move. Most North 
Americans had seen wild blackberry patches that stand well above head height. 
They consider it madness to try to enter one of these. This is the kind of thick I 
mean by thick jungle. Add this to the fact that every chop sends a precise signal of 
where you are and, by the way, you’re working uphill at about 46-degree angle. 
Oh and you haven’t eaten for two days.100 
Ignoring the physical difficulty of the geography became a glaring weakness of 
American high command to implement its strategy of attrition. As writer Michael Herr 
wrote after looking upon on old French map, “We know that for years now, there has 
been no country here but the war. The landscape has been converted to terrain, the 
geography broken down into its more useful components corps and zones, tactical areas 
of responsibility, vicinities of operation, outposts, positions, objectives & fields of 
fire.”101 As Herr insinuated American command could not truly see the war around them. 
They could not see the villages, the people and peasants trying to coexist between two 
dangerous forces at war. They could not see the grunts, and their harsh existence that 
fought them at every turn and blows to morale, of walking endlessly in circles that were 
mined and watched by Viet-Cong snipers waiting in ambush. As Michael Herr wrote 
about those in the rear: 
Roof of the Rex, ground zero. Men who looked like they’d been suckled by 
wolves, they could die right there and then, and their jaws would work for a half 
an hour. This is where they would ask you “are you a dove or a Hawk?” and 
“would you rather fight them here or in Pasadena?” Maybe we could beat them in 
Pasadena, I’d think, but I wouldn’t say it especially not where they knew that I 
knew that they weren’t really fighting anybody anyway, it made them touchy.102 
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They could not see the psychological toil of the war and instead buried the war’s 
complexity under simple platitudes of honor, good vs evil, manhood, and the power of 
America’s machinery. Words and methods that began to taste bitter as American soldiers 
experienced the absolute worst conditions with no gain or meaningful purpose. The war 
of attrition championed by American military command bore very little to the romantic 
nostalgia of John Wayne heroism. So, as the war progressed it violently wrung any 
meaning or personal glory.  
This narrative of circles reinforced a mountain of emptiness, and a growing lack 
of any purposeful narrative behind the soldier’s actions. These circles would continue to 
grow as President Lyndon Johnson increased the number of soldiers in South Vietnam 
from 300,000 in 1965 to 500,000 in 1968. Despite the troop increase the sheer size of the 
South Indochina’s geography proved troublesome. While the North Vietnamese Army 
and Viet Cong took incredible casualties, Hanoi always found an abundance of 
replacements.103 Despite millions of American volunteers and draftees it was never 
enough to cover the hundreds of miles of jungle and mountainous frontier-land that the 
enemy used as cover, infiltration and staging grounds for attacks. As historian James 
Ebert said, “Vietnam is a beautiful country, but proved to be almost impervious to 
American technology and it was particularly adept at sapping the physical endurance of 
American soldiers.”104 The American enterprise in South Vietnam was like a great 
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wooden ship sinking from thousands of tiny holes and with only a hundred corks to plug 
them.  
By 1968 after the Tet offensive and the ending of the siege of Khe Sanh, the war 
entered a very dark phase for most American soldiers. Tet was a military victory for 
American command, but a disaster for the war’s public perception. The popular 
perception of the war had been that Americans were fighting a weak, elusive enemy in 
the hinterlands of South Vietnam. In the months leading up to the Tet Offensive, 
Westmoreland and President Johnson both had promised the American public that the 
enemy was approaching a breaking point, and end of the war was not far off. The fact 
that Hanoi could launch this assault despite millions of tons of bombing on their industry, 
and the promises of their leaders shocked Americans to their core. Senator Bobby 
Kennedy in an expression of disgust would go on to say, “our enemy strikes at will across 
all of South Vietnam, has finally shattered the mask of official illusion which we have 
concealed by our true circumstance even from ourselves…”105  
Senator Kennedy voiced a growing doubt in not just the moral clarity over the 
Vietnam war, but the efficient and competency of the American military enterprise. 
Robert McNamara would highlight this when he proposed a massive mechanical wall of 
sensors, booby traps, mines, barbed wire, and bombing to cut the trail in two. For obvious 
reasons of logistics and practicality this wall never went beyond wishful thinking. The 
fundamental problem also unveiled one of the insecurities of American involvement. As 
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Newsweek stated, “America was rich in machines, but poor in front line soldiers.”106 This 
disparity of spirit, energy, and purpose was further elaborated by Senator Kennedy who 
would go on to say after Tet, “The Viet-Cong have demonstrated despite all of our 
reports of progress… that half a million American soldiers with 700,000 allies with total 
command of the air and sea backed by huge resources and the most modern weapons are 
unable to secure even a single city from the attacks of an enemy whose total strength is 
250,000.”107 
After the Tet Offensive the American media turned against Washington and gave 
voice to what many in the anti-war movement had been saying for years. No other battle 
more illustrated this growing discord then the Siege of Khe Sanh. With their faith rattled 
by the Tet Offensive, the American media and public eyes turned toward a small valley 
northwest of the DMZ. Khe Sahn is pinched between the North South Vietnam, and 
Cambodian borders, and was projected by General William Westmoreland to be a vital 
staging area for enemy infiltration. Over the course of several months, two marine 
regiments supported by elements of the Air Force and Army fought against 3 divisional 
sized regiments of North Vietnamese Army and Viet-Cong. Headlines showed desperate 
Marines huddling in trenches, their faces plastered with red dust hunkering down under 
heavy enemy shelling. American machinery and equipment lay strewn about mimicking a 
garbage heap more than an organized base of operations. Eventually the valley would be 
abandoned and while General Westmoreland claimed victory the powerful symbolism of 
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American soldiers’ helplessness in the valley was symbolically difficult for many 
Americans to perceive as “victory.” The end of Khe Sanh would be one of the last major 
set piece battles for the rest of the war operations while sometimes huge in scale never 
made significant enemy contact. It would signal the beginning of an even darker chapter 
for many frontline American soldiers. 
As writer and veteran Tim O’Brien related in his story Going After Cacciacto 
men saw the war in terms of time. Time left on patrol, time left until dawn, time left until 
their tour was over. Everything else was based on luck. Men asked questions such as 
would they step on a mine today? Would a sniper watch the trail today? Would their CO 
get a command from Da Nang to hump 10 miles in midday, would their water supply last 
until then? Unspeakable daily toil for these frontline soldiers caused immense misery. 
Pride came from the unspoken brotherhood from facing the pain together, even as it 
slowly gnawed at everyone’s tolerance for misery. By 1969 large army operations like 
Tet and Khe Sanh had become rarities as the Viet Cong shifted their tactics to more of 
evasion, booby traps, and ambush. Without the ability to stop supplies entering the south 
and without any meaningful change in American strategy, the war dragged into a political 
stalemate.108  
While other American offensives and political scandal would occur between 1969 
and 1975, the narrative of the war did not shift from the military stalemate and the 
increasing political pressure on the United States to abandon South Vietnam. It was also 
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during this time that one of popular memories of the Vietnam War was forged. It started 
with the shock of Tet and continued in the incredible transformation within American 
military morale during a 5-year period that would see the nadir of American military 
morale. Patrolling the jungles during this time would be one of the most meaningful steps 
for soldiers toward realizing the meaninglessness of the war. Patrol was something so 
mundane and yet so deadly without a wider purpose it buoyed an immediate and 
resonating symbol of the madness of the war from the American perspective. It was to the 
point where simply going out on patrol became a deep act of subversion against the 
official reasoning for the war.  
Amidst these stark realities, trust in and even the act of following the chain of 
command broke down, and open mutiny and threats toward over-eager officers were not 
entirely uncommon.109 In extreme cases officers were killed in acts American soldiers 
called “fragging.” This happened when officers, who were usually lifers, or worse stupid, 
got men killed or took them up trails they knew were booby trapped to “find’ an enemy 
that could not be found. Men understood that there was no longer any truth to the official 
reasons of why they were in Vietnam, thus making every death meaningless in their eyes. 
They were not there to save peasants from communists. Many American soldiers hated 
and mistrusted these people and often killed them out of suspicion. They were not there 
to win the war as any designs of victory had evaporated long ago. Men’s plans had 
become biological, not ideological.  
  
                                                 
109 James Gibson, The Perfect War: Technowar in Vietnam (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1986).  
64 
 
CHAPTER THREE  
TRANSFORMING THE MYTH: FROM PROGRESS TO DISILLUSIONMENT 
Literature, memoir, and film became crucial to building Vietnam as a metaphor 
for the wider American public.110 Historians have noted a great distortion that occurred 
during this time in American history as the Vietnam War created an ever-shifting 
landscape of popular imagery, film, literature: all subjected to the ever changing mores of 
popular culture and mass media. 111 While the narratives and conclusions where not 
always based within truth their impact on the American memory of the war is impossible 
to ignore. One such narrative that was in these stories was a highlighting of ecology in 
Vietnam’s War story. I suggest that this use of ecology gave what William Burch would 
call a “supernatural authenticity” that myths are granted with time.112 This authenticity 
helped build the metaphor of Vietnam’s “wilderness.”  
This metaphor of Vietnam as “wilderness” was explored by many different 
voices. Veteran James Webb claimed classical historical accounts were no longer 
appropriate to explain or narrate the Vietnam War.113 Historian Kate Meyers would also 
say, “Because Vietnam is so different from other wars in modern memory no good model 
exists for translating it into a traditional chronological narrative.”114 I suggest the ecology 
                                                 
110 Mark Taylor, The Vietnam War in History, Literature, & Film (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama 
Press, 2003), 25. 
111 Andrew Martin, Receptions of War. Vietnam in American Culture (Norman: University of Oklahoma 
Press, 1993), 50.  
112 William Burch, Daydreams and Nightmares: A Sociological Essay on the American Environment (New 
York: Harper & Row, 1971), 58.  
113 Taylor, 25. 
114 Taylor, 25. 
65 
 
of Vietnam became a narrative device for metaphors and explanations about the Vietnam 
war. For example, the Jungle itself ecologically spoke to the tangled, shadowy, and alien 
environment that mirrored the fantasies of the war. It was a foreign environment to 
American minds and could easily be molded within a narrative of “spooky” warfare, and 
“supernatural” transformation. In the Vietnam narration ecology is a source of 
authenticity, but also of chaos. It could be at times constructed as the foil to the false 
techno-reality imposed by a world of authority of the American world of modernism, 
liberalism, and progress. Or, in other instances a realm where nihilism and pain reign to 
disempower men’s attempts at gaining meaning and order. A primary arena for these 
metaphors was the literature and film on the Vietnam War.   
Vietnam literature by the early 1990s numbered well over 600 works of fiction 
and memoir helping generate many classic narratives that emotionally resonated with 
American audiences. Movies like Platoon, Apocalypse Now, Deer Hunter, Rambo, Born 
on the Fourth of July, and Hamburger Hill also crafted a unique popular memory of the 
war’s violence. Infusing tones of striking violence, loss of sanity, tragedy, 
disillusionment, and cognitive dissonance. Memoirs by eyewitnesses to the ordeals of the 
conflict such as journalists and frontline soldiers also became very popular in works such 
as A Rumor of War by Philip Caputo, If I Die in a Combat Zone by Tim O’Brien, Born on 
the Fourth of July by Ron Kovic, and Dispatches by Michael Herr. Fiction – some based 
on real life accounts – also exploded into the discourse with numerous works of varying 
narrative structures and thematic tones. Tim O’Brien’s large collection of works stands 
tall with highly notably and critical acclaimed novels such as Going After Cacciato, The 
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Things They Carried, and In the Lake of the Woods. Other well-known fictions include 
Meditations in Green by Stephen Wright, James Webb’s Fields of Fire, and William 
Eastlake’s The Bamboo Bed.  
One of the nastiest characters in Vietnam literature is its “wilderness.” Battles like 
Khe Sanh and Hamburger Hill related elemental themes of foggy, disturbing hillsides that 
evoke powerlessness, confusion, and waste. A twin theme of biology and conceptions of 
human nature can be found throughout these narratives. As the walls between the human 
world and the reality of nature begin to melt, as human geographer Linda Nash spoke, 
“historical agency becomes distributed among a multitude of entities: human, insects, 
microbes, trees, groundwater & chemicals. It is no longer easy to separate the human 
from the nonhuman world, to insist that modernity represents the triumph (for better or 
worse) of humans over nature.”115 Just like disease could influence human agency of 
empire and society, the metaphors of Vietnam removed illusions of a world that was 
orderly, logical, and with a progression: instead, Americans are left without victory, over 
a powerful, but mindless, savage “jungle.” A major piece of the American Vietnam 
experience was the highlighting of how powerless men were against the array of 
environmental forces before them. This experience became so pronounced that it was 
given a name by psychologist Guenter Levy, who classified the soldiers despair at facing 
their enemies use of the environment as, “inverted warfare.” Levy described this as a 
reversal of the values that were supposed to have been common sense. The American 
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military machine was a product of rationality, efficiency, and scientific principles and it 
was soundly defeated by nature and its protectors the Vietnamese.116 A view that could 
be seen in battles such as Khe Sanh or Hamburger Hill where hundreds of thousands of 
explosives were dropped by machines of war only for the enemy shortly after to pop up 
again from their dug in hiding places and continue to snipe, mortar, and attack American 
positions.  
This regression was often a framework by literature on the war that resembled 
environmental historian Patricia Limerick’s idea of “attitudes of nature.” Attitudes of 
nature is a complicated phrase that contains the wild and varied realm of human 
subjective experience and interpretation of the natural world.117 Thus, within American 
accounts of nature in Vietnam the attitudes changed considerably in both tone, use, and 
philosophy. Or, what environmental historian Donald Worster called the third form of 
environmental history that examines how nature can become part of a civilization’s 
rituals, identity, and culture.118 In the American context Vietnam and nature, often 
synonymous with each other, could appear as a deadly metaphor of madness, and 
sometimes as a fondness for the brutal primitiveness of the jungle: or, sometimes both, as 
spoken through the despondent voice of Captain Willard in Francis Ford Coppolla’s film, 
Apocalypse Now:  
Saigon, shit. I’m still only in Saigon. Every time I think I’m going to wake up 
back in the jungle. When I was home after my first tour it was worse. I’d wake up 
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and there’d be nothing…. When I was here I wanted to be there. When I was 
there, all I could think of was getting back into the jungle. I’ve been here a week 
now. Waiting for a mission, getting softer. Every minute I stay in this room I get 
weaker. And every time Charlie squats in the bush he gets stronger. Each time I 
look around the walls move in a little tighter.119 
Other voices used nature to describe a transformation into savagery as United States 
Marine Lieutenant Philip Caputo echoed in his preface to A Rumor of War.  
The air-conditioned HQ in Saigon and Danang seemed thousands of miles away. 
As for the USA we did not call it the “world” for nothing: it might as well have 
been on another planet. There was nothing familiar out where we were, no 
churches, no police, no laws… or any of the restraining influences without which 
the earth’s population of virtuous people would be reduced by 95%. It was the 
dawn of creation in the Indochina bush an ethical as well as geographical 
wilderness. Out there, lacking restraint, sanctioned to kill, confronted by a hostile 
country and a relentless enemy, we sank into a brutish state.120 
Nature was also interpreted as opportunity to inspire as Lyndon Johnson spoke to West 
Point graduates shortly before the start of the conflict in Vietnam, “The communist will 
find, that a nation which produced Davy Crockett and Daniel Boon, and Jim Bowie is 
afraid of no forest and no swamp and no game of fighting however toughly it is 
played.”121 Johnson used vivid American mythic imagery of it’s heroes to create a link 
between the past actions of these heroes and a new crop of young American soldiers.  
However, this landscape of heroism and romantic idealism often did not survive 
the war, and instead nature often fit into more nightmarish visions of American 
experiences in Vietnam. Nature would become distorted into an almost supernatural 
realm disconnected from America’s romantic mythos that upheld wilderness – at least – 
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as a place to conquer and find meaning. In the Vietnam lore of fiction, memoir, and 
reflection natured was used as constructed landscape: or, a form of fiction to make the 
setting a hyper, horror show of violence, and “mystery.” Nature was projected as a scary, 
inhospitable hellscape to help imbue the war with a deeper psychic meaning of horror and 
reinforce the fear of the unknown as seen in the Michael Herr’s well-known book - part 
fiction and part history – Dispatches:  
Everything up there was spooky, and it would have been that way even if there 
had been no war. You were there in a place where you didn’t belong, where 
things were glimpsed for which you would have to pay and where things were 
unglimpsed for which you would also have to pay, a place where they didn’t play 
with the mystery but killed you straight off for trespassing. The towns had names 
that laid a quick chilling touch on your bones: Kontum, Dak Matlop, Poli 
Klang….122 
In fictional works based on the experience of some writers like veteran Frank Boccia 
nature was viewed as it had been for centuries as an inaccessible ancient presence:  
The mountains were unlike any I had ever seen… Furthest away, barley seen were 
a subdued green: farther off, a grey green. Farthest away, barely seeing the 
Western sky, they were smoke grey. Over all of them lay a carpet of unfamiliar 
vegetation: tall slender trees, branchless until the spreading crowns of light green 
a their very tops: palms, fonds vines, low thorn bushes, eight-foot-high saw grass, 
and here and there dark green bamboo. I would learn to walk these mountains 
over the next 200 days, but they would remain forever alien.123  
Philip Caputo would also invoke the mountains around his own deployment in Da Nang 
as he spoke:  
We were flying parallel to the mountains the cordillera spread out before us. It 
was the most forbidding thing I had ever seen. An unbroken mass of green 
                                                 
122 Michael Herr, Dispatches (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1977), 95.  
123 Frank Boccia, The Crouching Beast: A United States Army Lieutenants Account of the Battle of 
Hamburger Hill, May 1969 (London: Macfarland & Company, 2013), 9. 
70 
 
stretched westward, one ridgeline and mountain range after another, some more 
than a mile high with forests the color of old moss. There it was the Annamae 
Cordillera, hostile and utterly alien. The Vietnamese themselves regarded it with 
dread, “out there” they called the humid wilderness where the Bengal tiger stalked 
and the cobra coiled beneath its rock and the Viet-Cong lurked in Ambush. Our 
mission was to find an enemy battalion. A battalion a few hundred men. The 
whole North Vietnamese Army could have concealed itself in that jungle sea and 
we were going to look for a battalion… I half expected those great mountains to 
shake with contemptuous laughter at our presence.124 
In these accounts’ nature has become something unknowable to these men. Before 
it had been a great landscape of potential: a place that held the secrets to manhood or 
honor in a fight against communism, and a place of adventure, intrigue, and history. 
Instead, it became an undecipherable primordial presence that they skirted over like flies 
on some great beast. Like the Indians and other primitive peoples of the world it was 
perceived that to live in these dangerous places invited men to return to a desperate 
savagery. This powerful primitivism could imbue men with great power to stalk, hunt, 
and fight, but also risks their death and separation from the spiritual nodes that connected 
them to civilization. These places in Vietnam were structured in Vietnam’s memory to be 
amazingly frightful, alien, and bizarre – at least – for those who did not belong within 
these places. It was a setting which fit veterans experience of their biophysical reality of 
pain and exhaustion, but also a historical myth of wilderness that views these places as 
far off realms of danger if not evil, as Michael Herr wrote in Dispatches. “The puritan 
belief that Satan dwelt in nature could have been born here, where even on the coldest, 
freshest mountain tops you could smell Jungle and that tension between rot and genesis 
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that all jungles gave off. It is ghost country and for Americans it has been the scene of 
some of the wars vilest surprises.”125  
Here we see nature through the eyes of fiction, prose, politicians, myths and 
contested landscapes of imagination, but nature was also a real ecological space. Indo-
China’s environment imposed a biophysical reality which highlighted both American and 
Vietnamese history, identity, and military tactics. The brutality and violence in the 
Indochina bush mirrored and invented several American cultural understandings of 
wilderness, as Philip Caputo showcased here:  
For weeks we had to live like primitive men on remote outposts, rimmed by alien 
seas of rice paddies and rainforests. Malaria blackwater fever, and dysentery… At 
night we squatted in muddy holes, picked off leeches that sucked on our veins and 
waited for an attack to come at us from the blackness beyond the perimeter 
wire.126  
As another soldier in Tim O’Brien’s The Things They Carried. “Don’t believe it – fine 
with me. But you don’t know human nature. You don’t know Nam.”127  
These memoirs and fictional works about the Vietnam War used a style of 
narration that used Vietnam’s ecology as a landscape to project a disillusionment, and the 
rapid disintegration of American Post War confidence. This disillusionment occurred in 
the various narratives of fiction and memoir along several themes such as alienation, 
subversive ideas against American myth, nihilism, and a distinct “meaningless” or 
“randomness,” to reflect the chaotic nature of the Vietnam War. I suggest that each theme 
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interacted with specific American attitudes of nature and projected these attitudes onto a 
culturally constructed Vietnam landscape. These attitudes changed based on author and 
intention, but overall, represented a “Fall” from the previous “Garden” of optimism, 
idealism, and American liberalism. One of the most pertinent and consistent dialogues 
was the new distinction and skepticism of a world of technology vs a “natural” ecology 
found within the Vietnam war.  
The popular ideological technocratic worldview that saw technology to improve 
the world was subverted by American machines causing destruction, erosion, and 
poisoning instead transforming Vietnam into a paradise. American technology embodied 
waste and weakness instead of power and confidence. The translation of this war between 
technology and nature appeared in the film Apocalypse Now by Francis Coppola. 
Through the narration of Captain Willard, the audience hears the voice of his target, the 
elusive Col. Walter Kurtz, who reveals in his manifesto his discovery of the war’s hidden 
truth:   
Commitment and Counter-Insurgency, by Col. Walter E. Kurtz.  
As long as our officers and troops (sic) perform tours of duty limited to one year, 
they will remain dilletantes in war and tourists in Vietnam. As long as cold beer, 
hot food, rock and roll and all the other amenities remain the expected norm, our 
conduct of the war will gain only impotence. (In the document, but not read aloud 
- The wholesale and indiscriminate use of firepower will only increase the 
effectiveness of the enemy and strengthen their resolve to prove the superiority of 
an agrarian culture against the world's greatest technocracy...The central tragedy 
of our effort in this conflict has been the confusion of a sophisticated technology 
with human commitment. Our bombs may in time destroy the geography, but they 
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will never win the war...)...We need fewer men, and better; if they were 
committed, this war could be won with a fourth of our present force...128 
Vietnam’s “nature” in these forms even reached to influence the realm of science fiction 
as Aliens director James Cameron explained in an interview on that film.  
One of the themes of the film is that these technologically advanced soldiers 
succumbed to a technologically inferior, but more determined enemy that they 
don’t know how to fight, which is really kind of a Vietnam metaphor where 
basically U.S. forces got their buts kicked by barefoot guys running through the 
jungle. Because they didn’t understand how to fight that war. They didn’t 
understand their enemy, or the determination of that enemy.129  
As the “ultimate” set up for this idea James Cameron discussed the scene where the 
cocky marine Hudson loudly boasted of the advanced tools and weaponry they had on 
hand as they descended to the wild frontier planet below, loudly proclaiming they were 
the “ultimate badasses!”   
 These fictions suggested another candid way nature impacted American views of 
narration. Instead of the narrative of progress, the Aliens metaphor for Vietnam was a 
reminder of the natural forces that exist outside of humans control no matter their 
technological state. It was a reminder of human’s limitations to use technology to control 
the world. The narrative here was less confident and more existential in tone then the 
bombastic films of the previous decades. Technology became an immediate villain for 
many intellectuals who viewed its overuse as a piece in the eventual decay of America’s 
future. As historian Andrew Ross wrote, “There has long been and still is, an unlikely 
consensus among certain voices from the right and the left about the intrinsic evils of new 
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technologies and the monstrous mass cultures they give birth.”130 By extension the 
opposing world of “Alien,” and its power of tooth and claw was extended to the 
Vietnamese guerrillas who were portrayed as representations of the power of nature, and 
societies willing to live within them. This was a narrative that mingled with broader and 
ancient American myths and traditions about the savage native and the power residing in 
their ferocity and knowledge of dangerous wilderness. The inability of Americas to 
conquer that wilderness was a direct repudiation of the traditional American mythos of 
exploring, conquering, and settling nature into civilization. It was a myth predicated on a 
large narrative of progress across a vast series of barbarism and wilderness until the light 
civilization and progress reaches from sea to shining sea.  
America’s perception of its character of pioneers and adventurers was brought 
low by the reminder of human biological fragility in difficult terrain and the mindless 
suffering found within. Attempting to conquer the Vietnamese environment ending in 
defeat, and instead created a new cultural fascination with wilderness: only, it was one 
steeped in deeply dystopian and nihilistic themes. The faith in democratic liberalism was 
also deeply disturbed. The idea of an inclusive world order of democracy led by the 
paternal hand of the United States was brought low by a visibly uncaring, alien, hostile, 
and victorious Vietnamese people. America had offered only hardship, pain, and acts of 
atrocity instead of John Wayne grit and cowboy heroism. Events such as My Lai 
disturbed and disquieted American spirits more than any other moment in the war. It was 
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a moment of utter disbelief that American actions could compare or resonate with that of 
Nazism or Communist atrocities.  
As a result, a new skepticism arose within America over its past and the reliability 
of narratives to represent reality. As Historian Bruce Franklin stated,  
There is a third view that has gained considerable influence in intellectual circles 
that sees any master “master narrative” or “meta-narrative” or, for that matter, any 
coherently structured narrative – as a socially constructed fantasy that radically 
falsifies the fragmentary, conflicted, and de-centered character of social 
experience.131 
In the immediate aftermath of the war during the 70s this would result in what historian 
Bruce Schulman called a culminative “letting loose” of American society.132 Intellectuals 
from the right and left both expressed fears of new evils of what previously during the 
age of liberal consensus had been integral pieces of the social cohesion, development, 
and progression of society.  
Later trends in historical and journalistic accounts often found themselves tracing 
the war’s meaning back toward the existential enemy of heat, nature, and alien landscape 
which they could not overcome. Both as soldiers and as. As Historian Francis Fitzgerald 
invoked in her influential book Fire in the Lake:  
Young American men from the small towns of America, the GIs who came to 
Vietnam found themselves in a place halfway around the world among people 
with whom they could make no human contact… And they found themselves not 
attacking fixed positions but walking through the jungle and through villages 
among small yellow people... but the enemy remained invisible, not only in the 
jungle but among the people of the villages – an almost metaphysical enemy who 
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inflicted upon them heat, boredom, terror, and death and gave them nothing to 
show for it – no territory taken, no visible sign of progress except the bodies of 
small yellow men.133 
 I find it compelling that even in the most critical voices and narratives of the war 
such as Francis Fitzgerald’s, where American actions in Vietnam are compared to the 
likes of Nazi Germany nature found itself at the center of these narratives. Ideologies 
such as imperialism, American racial attitudes, and crony capitalism competed with the 
Indochina landscape to explain the death of Vietnamese civilians and American belief in 
progress. As historian Richard Drinnon showcased:  
Yet where were the targets of such operations with their surface names? 
Unobliging they would not “stand up and fight,” but glide back into their leafy 
hiding places or into their villages. Spectral enemies, they were at once nowhere 
and everywhere in their land with its mines and booby traps, rice paddies you 
slashed through waist deep and mountainous jungles you hardly penetrate with its 
heat and dust of the dry season and mud of the wet. With its cloud of flies and 
mosquitos and its stench of animal and human dung.134 
Other accounts of the daily massacres of Vietnamese civilians such as Kill Anything That 
Moves by Nick Turse also showcased the environment as helping lead men toward 
murder, as he wrote here:  
From them I learned something of what it was like to be twenty years old, with 
few life experiences beyond adolescence in a small town or inner city 
neighborhood, and to be suddenly thrust into villages of thatch and bamboo 
homes that ripped straight from the pages of National Geographic, the paddies 
around them such a vibrant green that they almost burned the eye. Veteran after 
veteran told me about days of shattering fatigue and the confusion of 
contradicting orders, about being placed in situations so alien and unnerving that 
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even with their automatic rifles and grenades they felt scared walking through 
hamlets of unarmed women and children.135  
Perhaps due to the intimate symbolism of Indochina’s vast wilderness and 
landscape of green jungles and “primitive” dwellings, the metaphor of ecology became 
such a prominent tool to explore the end of many people’s belief in American progress. 
Authors began to use the new spectral landscape of Vietnam’s nature to infuse narratives 
that resonated powerful new ideologies of alienation from American society. As 
Historian John Hellman stated:  
In these works, we can see how the American story, the American idea of its 
meaning in the flow of history, was transformed for many Americans by the 
landscape they now saw in Vietnam. Perceiving Vietnam as a confrontation 
between the forces of technology and nature… the American frontier: however, 
this landscape reveals the meeting of savagery and civilization to have a different 
meaning from that of traditional American myth.136  
The eventual defeat in Vietnam resonated a tremor in the web within America’s 
mythos. Symbolically, this belief systems defeat in Vietnam reasserted several older 
American and European myths surrounding ecology viewed as “dangerous” or “painful.” 
Another narrative tool was to find soldiers, draftees, and other American men caught in 
the tragedy of the war falling away from their morality in wilderness. These narratives 
depicted a nihilistic, and illogical world of ecology. Certain traditions have often referred 
to this world as “wilderness” and its form varied in representation of Vietnam War 
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fiction. This was the realm of Captain Konrad Kurtz in Apocalypse Now, Sergeant Bob 
Barnes in Platoon, or fictional Vietnam guerillas torturing American POWs in Rambo.   
 
 
Fig. 3: Francis Ford Coppola, motion picture poster, Apocalypse Now, Zoetrop Studios,. 
c.1979. From https://www.loc.gov/item/2013645941/ 
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The poster for this eerie horror landscape was Francis Ford’s Apocalypse Now. 
The poster for the film displayed all the tropes of the classic Vietnam imagery. Far away 
American choppers in huge numbers flying to some distant target, and below a slow 
winding river descending deeper and deeper into a blood orange horizon, surrounded by a 
mist shrouded jungle. Unlike depictions of nature in previous decades of film the 
morality of Apocalypse Now relates a subversive ideology against the clear themes of 
good vs evil seen in cowboy heroism of past films. The subversion told of chaos, human 
primitivism, brutality, violence, and insanity as markers of not a time lost to American 
frontiers but born of present American actions. This violence became more pronounced 
the further the characters in the film descended into the Jungle. It is important to note this 
as the physical separation from safety, civilization, and human constructs like buildings 
grew so too did insanity, violence, and incoherence for the characters. At one-point 
Captain Willard and his small band of men arrived in the middle of the night at a stranded 
American outpost. Around them flares shot into the sky and the world was pitch black 
with men who crawled toward their boat pleading to be let on so they could escape from 
the nightmare.  
The jungles, villages, and rice paddies of Vietnam took on the form of landscape 
of horrors and surrealist nightmares. Even the tamest descriptions invoked a deep unease 
with Americans years after Vietnam as Susan Brownmiller remembered about a 
Vietnamese restaurant in New York the locals called Vietnam Village. “The name gave 
me the shivers – concertina wire, strategic hamlets, GIs torching thatched roofs with 
Zippo lighters. In a matter of months, the restaurant closed for lack of business. I 
80 
 
probably wasn’t the only neighborhood person who just couldn’t make it through the 
door.”137 Vietnam’s “wilderness” served as a landscape of the great unknowns. In Jayne 
Philip’s Machine of Dreams Billy spooke to his sister through letter of the kind of war he 
was fighting, a war that is unreal and surreal. As he wrote here:  
My real feeling is that I’m not so scared of being dead, if its fast-I’m scared as 
shit of lying in some Jungle all fucked up, waiting for a dust off that can’t get to 
me because the zone is too hot….On the ground it can be hell and crazy and you 
still never see any Cong but dead ones. It’s like they’ve just been there and turned 
everything to fuck or their invisible, raining ammo in. Like cowboys and Indians, 
except the Indians are ghosts and they can’t lose because nothing really kills 
them.138   
In the crime drama True Detective, the pessimistic ex detective Rust Cole related 
the scene of finding two children brutalized in the backwoods of the Louisiana bush. 
“Man, that place I never… it reminded me of my pop talking about Nam. And the Jungle 
thing.”139 It was a place away from the eyes of the protector’s society or of any kind of 
law and decency. The horror came from the doings of men who returned to brutality in a 
wild state. Soldiers discussed the horror in the aftermath of the massacring of Vietnamese 
villagers in the film Platoon:   
Now, he's taken us this far, right? He'll take us the rest of the way. 
A Christian don't go around a village cutting off heads and shit. 
This shit is really getting outta hand, man. Way outta control. 
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Seems to me that you don't seem to know the difference, the way you shoot up that shit 
all the time. 
I don't know, brothers, but I'm hurting really bad inside. 
Don't worry about it. Elias won't be able to prove a thing. 
- He's a troublemaker. - Elias is a water-walker. 
Like them politicians in Washington trying to fight this war... 
with one hand tied around their balls. 
Ain't no need or time for a courtroom out here.140 
 
Tim O’Brien in The Things They Carried also referenced soldiers dismay at the strange 
supernatural energy that the enemy moved through the difficult landscape, turning order 
and power from an environment that sapped and weakened American bodies. As he wrote 
here, “The countryside itself seemed spooky – shadows and tunnels and incense burning 
in the dark. The land was haunted. We were fighting forces that did not obey the laws of 
twentieth century science.”141 The war also follows a traditional war story with the laws 
of violence and confusion amped to the maximum. The violence heightened by the 
disorderly surroundings of the landscape, as writer Larry Heinemann wrote in Paco’s 
Story.  
Tracking an NVA company they fuckin’ tell us, and guys’re dropping like flies, 
Jack-horrible fucking heat exhaustion, ordinary ambushes, sniper fire, Chicom 
claymore mines as big as tractor tires… Guys with their heads cracked open like 
walnuts ,bleeding from the ears and the scalp. Guys with their chests squashed flat 
from fucking-A booby trapped bombs. Guys with their legs blown off at the 
thighs … Shi! Mean and evil blood all over everything and my ass in it up to the 
elbows. I still dream about it nights – nightmare monsters that smell to high 
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heaven, nasty whirligig looking contraptions that keep snatching at you, slobbery 
looking warlocks with the evil fucking eye that gives you cold sweats and shivers 
so bad you think you got some dynamite case of malaria… We thrashed around in 
that fuckin woods – the Goongone Forest, you understand-that night, the next day, 
the next night, and that day. And we were always lost.142  
These stories displayed nature within narrative tropes of madness, seduction, and 
disillusionment. A primary mechanism was to emphasis points of geography or wildlife 
to illustrate a metaphor of a personal experience: or, to create a resonating image for the 
reader. This could be a hill, a jungle, a rice paddy, or even a Vietnamese village. 
Throughout the films and memoir these areas became identified with this “wilderness.” 
For Americans this “wilderness” was traditionally a place of power, a symbolic node in 
their nations crest of myth. American traditional views of wilderness were a place to be 
conquered, protected. It was both an antagonistic force that shaped American heroes and 
its people, and a space of opportunity for the ideals of freedom and democracy. In the 
Vietnam narrative wilderness emerged to serve as the chaotic realm of disillusionment.   
In an environmental context nature can help transform narratives of a people. It 
can either inform the story with confidence or power or dread and terror. The American 
myth of nature before Vietnam was one of victory and conquest. It was a story of a 
people subduing a continent, conquering savagery and turned it into an enlightened 
civilization. This is Donald Worster approach of cultural environmental history or the 
third way of environmental history that sees the means in which humans codify aspects of 
the natural world into our rituals, symbols, tradition, and iconography.143.  The agency of 
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ecology in the Vietnam War within this methodology was to reinforce the metaphor of 
disillusionment. Part of the power behind this metaphor came from the physicality of the 
war itself: the legs turning to jelly and the stomach turning into soup amidst the heat and 
exhaustion of humping up and down and up and down the same hills and paddies for 
months on end. Men became in this instance utterly biological beings that must conceive 
of death in rather nasty and uninspiring ways.  
In Tim O’Brien’s work The Things they carried one soldier told another a classic 
tale of the spooky jungle. As Rat, the charming storyteller, told his friends of the lost 
platoon:   
And man, I’ll tell you – its spooky. This is mountains. You don’t know spooky till 
you been there… everything all wet and swirly and tangled and you can’t see 
jack, you can’t find your own pecker to piss with. Like you don’t have a body. 
Serious spooky. You just go with the vapors – the fog sort of takes you in… and 
the sounds man. You hear stuff nobody should ever hear…”144 This wonderous 
series of prose invokes a fearful experience by these men caught in a world that is 
alien and dangerous. What happens next according to the storyteller “Rat” the 
nervous soldiers begin to hear strange music from the mountains, and a rising 
swell of human voices singing and talking. The land itself comes alive with 
spectral sounds as the soldier told his skeptical friend here, “All these different 
voices. Not human voices though. Because it’s the mountains, follow me? The 
rock its talking. And the fog, too, and the grass & the god damn mongooses. 
Everything talks the tree talk politics, the monkeys talk religion. The whole 
country. Vietnam. The place talks. It talks. Understand? Nam it truly talks.145 
 
 The story ended with the panicky platoon calling in everything they had to burn 
the forest and mountains around them in a cornucopia of destruction as Rat told here, 
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“The guys can’t cope. They lose it. They get on the radio and report enemy movement – a 
whole army, they say and order up firepower…. They make those mountains burn.”146 I 
think ultimately the point of this story told by O’Brien through a fictional soldier to 
another is recreate the great presence of the unknown in Vietnam. And in response to that 
unknown America destroyed and burned with its technology what it could not 
understand. America’s rationalistic universe responded in utter fear and panic which 
resulted in wanton destruction. The spookiness of the Vietnamese jungle, the mountains, 
the spectral misty hillsides, the unfathomable heat, the Vietnamese people, the endless 
trail humping, low visibility and countless other aspects of the war that made men feel 
helpless and vulnerable. As writer Bobbie Mason wrote In Country through the 
characters of Sam and Pete where the veteran Pete explained the incomprehensible to the 
questioning teenager Sam, “Stop thinking about Vietnam Sambo. You don’t know how it 
was, and you never will. There is no way you can ever understand. So, just forget it. 
Unless you’ve been humping the boonies, you don’t know. “What’s humping the 
boonies?” “that means going out in some god forsaken wilderness and doing what you 
have to do to survive…”147 By constructing nature in this way in Vietnam it helped give 
authenticity and subtly played on a basic fear felt inside humans, that is, the fear of the 
unknown.  
Many pieces of literature presented Vietnam’s nature as eldritch form, or 
something that is unfathomable. Narratives used nature here for the purpose of 
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highlighting corruption of the human soul.148 For Tim O’Brien the unknowable construct 
of nature was both a destructive force and an alluring call for his characters. In another 
story O’Brien told a tale of an American woman named Mary Anne who was brought 
over to a remote outpost by her boyfriend, something that started as a joke. However, 
over time she slowly succumbed to the corruption – or, as indicated by some, purifying - 
allure of the wilderness around her. The riveting experience of wandering the jungles for 
enemy patrols and living in a state of primitiveness invigorated her mind and body unlike 
anything back in America, a world of comfort and convenience. Eventually Mary 
abandoned the world of rationalism and enlightenment for the more barbaric, but 
liberating, life of the war out in the jungle. As she would later tell her boyfriend, “When 
I’m out there at night, I feel close to my own body, I can feel my blood moving my 
fingers, and my fingernails, everything, it’s like I’m full of electricity – I’m on fire. 
Almost – I’m burning away into nothing – but it doesn’t matter because I know exactly 
who I am. You can’t feel that anywhere else.”149 After several instances of Mary Ann 
sneaking off with the mysterious Green Berets, her boyfriend confronted her in the Green 
Berets makeshift camp which was a place of reeking primal energy as the narrator 
recounts:  
The place seemed to echo with a weird deep wilderness sound – tribal music – 
bamboo flutes and drums and chimes – the smell – two kinds of smell. There was 
a topmost scent of joss sticks and incense, like fumes of some exotic smokehouse, 
but beneath the smoke lay a deeper and much more powerful stench. Impossible 
to describe, Rat said. It paralyzed your lungs. Thick and numbing, like an 
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animal’s den, a mix of blood and scorched hair and excrement and the sweet-sour 
odor of moldering flesh – the stink of the kill. On a post at the rear of the hooch 
was a decayed head of a large black leopard: strips of yellow brown skin dangled 
from the overhead rafters. And bones. Stacks of bones – all kinds – to one side 
propped against a wall, stood a poster in neat black lettering: assemble your own 
gook. Free sample kit!150  
 Attempting to confront Mary Ann over her dangerous forays instead turned into a 
total rebuke of the men sitting at the edge of the forest “playing” at a game of war. As 
Mary Ann told her troubled boyfriend:  
You are in a place,” Mary Ann whispered softly, “where you don’t belong.” She 
moved her hand in a gesture that encompassed not just the hooch but everything 
around it, the entire war, the mountains, the mean little villages, the trails and 
trees and rivers and deep misted over valleys. “You just don’t know,” she said, 
“you hide in this little fortress, behind wire and sandbags, and you don’t know 
what’s out there or what its all about or how it all feels to really live in it. 
Sometimes I want to eat this place. Vietnam. I want to swallow the whole country 
– the dirt, the death. I just want to eat it and have it there inside of me. 
America viewed their encounter, and ultimate failure, with Vietnam under a 
specific narrative of progress. They expected enlightenment ideas of freedom, science, 
and rationalism to transform Vietnam. However, these values had an opposite effect that 
transformed American soldiers into people who had become alienated from this 
rationalistic and progressive universe. Some were driven insane, others became monsters, 
and others simply “fell away” and disappeared into the wilderness just like Mary Ann, 
who eventually suffered this fate as the narrator recounted. “She wanted more, she 
wanted to penetrate deeper into the mystery of herself. And then one morning, all alone, 
Mary Anne walked off into the mountains and did not come back.”151 As soldiers 
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discussed later, they said that Mary Anne had, “… crossed to the other side. She was part 
of the land.”152 In a common obsession with nature’s hand in causing a return to 
primitiveness or barbarism, O’Brien told of a person who met Indochina’s wilderness and 
was lost within it.  
In the short story Kid McArthur by Stephanie Vaughn a character related the loss 
of a family member to the horror of Vietnam. “Even in my imagination, I could not go 
where he had gone. All I knew was that somewhere in the Jungle had been a boy named 
Dixon, a boy from Oklahoma who had grown up on land just like my father used to 
hunt… But now Dixon was a nut who sent ears through the mail…”153 Other works such 
as Heavenly Blue Answer told of another lost American soul as shown here. “And late 
that night James found his way home, through LA streets and the Vietnam jungle, to his 
apartment… The next day was a warm smoggy day in the jungle. James was out on the 
sidewalks early, laughing and mumbling to himself with the best of them. Yet the Jungle 
was here to stay now. He was sure of that.  He would never force it all back into his head 
again. It was too big for that.”154 James and Dixon were lost to the war. They succumbed 
to the violence and drifted from their sanity and humanity.  
Perhaps the most iconic character within this narrative of jungle and wilderness is 
Walter E. Kurtz played by actor Marlon Brando in the film Apocalypse Now. Like the 
book Heart of Darkness, that the film is based on, Walter Kurtz had gone insane in a wild 
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dangerous land. The lands of Africa, or in the American context Vietnam, serves as a 
projection of a frontier. A place that in the American context traditionally offered 
opportunity for bold entrepreneurs and heroic adventures: the kind of men who built 
civilizations. However, much like Heart of Darkness this frontier was different. The 
frontier created a dark mirror into the adventure’s soul. The would-be hero becomes a 
twisted figure mocking the values of his homeland by escaping deep into the jungles 
where he discovered the ancient human “heart of darkness.” This metaphor in Conrad’s 
Heart of Darkness is a broad analysis of the darkness within the human soul, and the 
corruption of slavery, imperialism, within the west’s spirit.  
In Apocalypse Now Kurtz is a vehicle to attack the values of his society upon 
realizing Vietnam for what is was: a maddening horror show. Once a proud soldier 
dutifully serving his nation Kurtz fell into madness and sequesters himself deep within 
the Mekong wilderness. There, fighting both Viet-Cong and American forces alike, Kurtz 
was deemed a dangerous madman by American military command, and they sent out a 
team to find and eliminate him. As the story unfolded the audience saw a wide array of 
disturbing imagery of the war. It came to be that Kurtz was driven insane when he 
observed the war for what it really was – a representation of the mass revealing of the 
war’s true horror. It is through Kurtz and many others that I suggest one of the primaries 
uses of Vietnam’s ecology occurred. What we are saw in Kurtz was the fall of American 
idealism and optimism. As the film depicted of the wilderness of Vietnam American men 
met the chaos of war and lost their sanity and morality. They lost sight of their guiding 
star of manifest destiny and purpose. Progress ended and history began again, and 
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America emerged defeated: yet another decadent empire that reached its peak, instead of 
reaching the transcendent Eden of paradise.  
Philip Caputo’s A Rumor of War, or James Webb’s Fields of Fire and other 
classical stories also involved ecology into their own personal tales of disillusionment. In 
Meditations in Green by Stephen Wright nature appeared in short stories where plants 
and vegetation were given a chronicle of growth only to disappear in an explosion by 
American interdiction bombing.155 Writers emphasized ecology to relate the loss of any 
meaning behind suffering. As Frank Boicca spoke of in the final battle in The Crouching 
Beast: 
We lifted off, and as the pilot turned eastward, the beast lay before me naked and 
blood ugly in the grey afternoon light. I stared at it without really understanding 
the emotions I felt: Anger, yes & hatred, for the hill itself, for the uncaring mass 
of rock & clay, this beast lying sprawled before me, baneful even in death. I hated 
the beast not simply because of the guilt and grief I felt for the death of my men… 
it was much more than that. I hated the thing because in the end, it had so 
effortlessly demanded everything from me and taken it, without my consent, 
without my volition, without even my understanding. I had been sucked dry, 
stripped bare & cast away as a fly, snared and bound and eaten by a voracious 
spider is discarded into hellish midden.  .. But the worst of it was the knowledge I 
was no helpless fly struggling in the web. I had moral choice. That was what the 
beast had done to us and why I had hated it so. Father how can you forsake me 
and bring me to face an evil I had no hope of avoiding? You left me to confront 
the beast with no other weapon than my will and no armor except my humanity. 
In the end, it barely noticed its victory.156 
Frank Boccia related this fall is the failure of his men’s humanity in the presence of 
something that ultimately didn’t care either way.  
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This return to a state of living as an animal without a broader meaning upset the 
men who fought in Vietnam. As James Webb wrote in his book Fields of Fire:  
I can sleep in the rain, wrapped inside my poncho, listening to the drops beat on 
the rubber like small explosions, then feeling the water pour in rivulets inside my 
poncho, soaking me as I lie in the mud. I can live in the dirt, sit and lie and sleep 
in the dirt, it is my chair and my bed, my floor and my walls, this clay. And like 
all of you, I have endured diarrhea as only an animal should endure it, squatting a 
yard off a trail and relieving myself unceremoniously, naturally, animally. 
Deprivations of food. Festering, open sores. Worms. Heat. Aching crotch that 
nags for fulfillment, any emptying hole that will relieve it. Who appreciates my 
sufferings? Who do I suffer for?”157 
In Meditations in Green Stephen Wright wrote an inner dialogue of a fighter jet pilot who 
spent his days bombing the Vietnamese jungle incessantly. “My analyst claims playing in 
the shrubbery is dangerously regressive. Doesn’t Satre seem to indicate that vegetation is, 
all contraire, an oppressive presence, a distasteful reminder of the essentially nihilistic 
and somewhat detrop quality of nature’s palliative force?”158  
The experience typical for a war had become meaning without the context of 
victory, support, or a broader narrative to attach the suffering to. Many men dreamt of a 
way out of the combat as Marine Johnnie Clark remembered. “We called it “World 
Dreaming” Sometimes it was air conditioning or driving a car again. Sometimes it was 
strawberry shortcake and ice cream.159 The American dream reminded men of the 
material abundance and many joked that the only way to win the war was to convert the 
Vietnamese with their cornucopia of excess. As two soldiers recounted jokingly in 
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Stephen Wright’s Meditations in Green. As far as I can tell, the only way we are ever 
going to get a leg up on this war is to give every damn gook his own two-bedroom ranch 
complete with nice shrubbery, a lawn, and a white picket fence. What about a garage, 
they’re gunna need a garage to.”160 
 These dialogues suggested a rising insecurity over a spiritual malaise in America 
caused by its abundance. The Vietnam War opened the door to a deep spiritual scar over 
American faith in its society. The Vietnamese popular narrative remembered the war and 
the landscapes of jungle as a place of pain and violence. However, unlike the Americans 
their pain was in sacrifice for a noble cause with many veterans remembering the jungle 
fondly.161 They fought for unification and against American Imperialism. As General 
Tran Van Tra wrote in a Poem after the war:  
We eat the fruit. But we must honor 
Those who planted the tree. 
When you return to the city in Victory. 
Never forget your life in the Jungle. 
Thanks to your comrades 
Now in success 
Forgot not their friendship.162 
The disparity of views of nature was put on vivid display in Tim O’Brien’s dialogue 
between soldiers and a Vietnamese officer in Going After Cacciato. “The land.” Li Van 
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hgoc said softly, “The Soldier is but the representation of the land. The land is your true 
enemy.”163 
The desire to return to the jungle was felt by American soldiers as well and was 
another trope in Vietnam War literature. As seen in Bobbie Mason’s In Country where 
the veteran Tom described the need to escape the town. “Sometimes when I feel 
homesick for those memories, I get on a dirt bike and just go out and bump around the 
woods behind the fairgrounds. I just let the memories come. It’s like being back with 
them... But you must go someplace like that, off to the bottom, or out on a dirt bike trail. 
You can’t stay in town and afford to think about what happened.”164  
 Ultimately, I suggest that the Vietnam War can be interpreted as part of a larger 
story of the human form of narrating events, and how they present ecology within those 
events to impart different emotional meanings. Nature in the human context can mean a 
great many things from the real to the imagined, but with Vietnam nature happened to 
come into deep contact with American identity. American values were partly so disturbed 
because their own mythology was centered on the grand human project of a liberal 
democratic order. An order that was upheld to be a final solution to the historical ebb and 
flow of empire and disaster. The Vietnam War emerged as the biggest setback for this 
ideology, if not setting the groundwork for its defeat entirely. The symbolic reversal of so 
many American myths compounded upon one another creating a feeling of apocalypse 
for those who had viewed this era with such great optimism. At the heart of this 
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disruption as I suggested in this thesis was a central obsession with certain forms and 
ideals of “American” nature in pre-Vietnam imagery, political rhetoric and national myth, 
and these same ideals transforming in a new post-Vietnam war context. What Vietnam 
showcased was the uses of specific narratives about nature that perceived certain ecology 
as deeply disturbing or were useful to construct metaphors for larger cultural meanings 
such as disillusionment, despair, and subversive ideas of the ideals of progress.  
 While much of this thesis centered on the war itself, I wish to emphasize 
narration. The seemingly intrinsic human need to narrate our actions above random 
chronicle is what made so many of the primary sources stand out to me while doing 
research for this Thesis.165 Above anything else there is almost an unconscious 
commentary in these works occurring over the ancient problem of humankind’s battle 
against an uncaring chaotic universe. In the context of the Vietnam war this narrative was 
rediscovered: resonating violently against the American conceptions of their quasi 
utopianism. A narrative detailing the struggle between the height of American civilization 
in the middle 20th century and a troubling return to the “wilds” of nature’s embrace.  
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